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INTRODUCTION 
Blight findings have functioned as a cornerstone for condemnation tak-
ings since the severe urban decline in the middle of the twentieth century 
prompted governments at every level, throughout the country, to actively 
intervene in the real estate market.  Elements of blight, and then the term 
itself, became a foundational basis for this governmental intervention.  But 
using blight as a basis for that intervention has become increasingly con-
troversial as its application has moved from slum clearance to urban rede-
velopment, then to economic development projects, and on to revenue en-
hancing projects—all the while its definition expanded.  Immediately 
following the outcry over the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London,1 homeowners, business activists, and state politicians, or-
 
∗ Martin E. Gold is a partner at Sidley Austin LLP, an Adjunct Professor of Real Estate De-
velopment at Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preserva-
tion, and formerly served as New York City’s Director of Corporate Law in the New York 
City Law Department.  Lynne B. Sagalyn is the Earle W. Kazis & Benjamin Schore Profes-
sor of Real Estate at Columbia University Graduate School of Business. 
 1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, the city of New London, acting through its develop-
ment agency, approved a development plan to revitalize its ailing economy and initiated 
condemnation proceedings against owners of property (residential) that refused to sell.  The 
Supreme Court said the City could not take petitioners’ land simply to confer a private bene-
fit on a particular private party, but that the takings in this case did not “benefit a particular 
class of identifiable individuals.”  The City, it observed, was trying to coordinate a variety 
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ganized to “reform” their state’s eminent domain statutes.  A redefinition of 
blight became a top agenda item.  Over its more than half century of use, 
blight had become a well-worn term of art.  But its application to takings is 
subjective and malleable, so much so that it can now be said to be in the 
eyes of the beholder.  When applied in the interests of curing slum condi-
tions and remedying unsafe and unsanitary urban conditions, it generally 
functioned as intended.  When applied for the purpose of initiating urban 
revitalization, it also functioned mostly as intended, but all too often with 
very negative consequences for the large numbers of low-income and mi-
nority households and businesses that were uprooted and displaced.  But as 
its application has moved into other domains, including pure fiscal gain and 
competitive quests to retain and expand corporate facilities, it has been 
stretched and misused. 
In this Article, we take a close look at the issue of blight, its use, and its 
abuse.  In Part I, we briefly describe the origins of the use of blight, and 
discuss how, in the absence of a clear and unambiguous definition, the 
eminent domain statutes of the nation’s fifty states describe blight through 
multiple and very diverse criteria.  Even prior to Kelo, several states 
enacted reforms aimed at curbing abuses arising from tabula rasa blight 
criteria, but these reforms did not change the highly subjective character of 
its determination.  Part II is devoted to laying out a hierarchy of project 
uses and benefits.  Eminent domain is a balance between government and 
public needs on the one hand and property owner rights on the other.  By 
creating the hierarchy we can compare the amount of public benefits on the 
one hand and private benefits on the other in any project.  This ladder of 
uses and benefits moves from pure public benefit at the top, down to nearly 
total private benefit at the bottom.  Where a particular eminent domain tak-
ing falls along the spectrum of the hierarchy will depend upon its ratio of 
public benefits to private benefits.  We hope that this will help create a use-
ful perspective and tool to evaluate the usage of eminent domain and blight 
findings. 
In Part III, we consider Columbia University’s expansion in Manhattan-
ville and how the findings of blight there were assessed very differently by 
 
of commercial, residential, and recreational land uses, to form a greater whole.  And al-
though the City would not be opening the condemned land to general public use, the Court 
reaffirmed its long held view that public use is interpreted to mean “public purpose.”  The 
promotion of economic development, it said, is a long-accepted governmental function, and 
there was no principled way of distinguishing economic development projects from the oth-
er public purposes recognized by the Court.  Given the facts of the case, and the Court’s pol-
icy of deference to legislative judgments as to what public needs justify the use of the tak-
ings power, the takings in Kelo, it held, satisfy the Fifth Amendment.  The condemnation in 
Kelo did not depend on a blight finding. 
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New York’s Appellate Division and Court of Appeals.  In Part IV, we dis-
cuss the extent to which the post-Kelo reforms enacted in forty-three states 
redefined blight; and, in Part V, we discuss how political and business 
forces have weakened and reduced efforts to enact serious reforms.  In ad-
dressing abuses in the use of blight criteria, in Part VI, we look again at the 
reforms made in the post-Kelo era and focus on the creation of a better de-
finition through the elimination of the most abused criteria and the use of 
quantification.  Believing as we do that there are clear and compelling rea-
sons for using the power of eminent domain for public purposes (and not 
just pure public use) our purpose is to see established thoughtfully crafted, 
objective, and measurable standards for the determination of blight. 
I.  BLIGHT DETERMINATIONS: MORE FACILITATING THAN LIMITING 
The idea was unconventional, and controversial, from the start.  As a 
condition to be ameliorated by concerted government intervention, “blight” 
had to be invented.2  The notion that certain physical, social, and economic 
conditions short of being a slum, though not yet a slum, only on the way to 
likely becoming a slum, presented a danger for cities and a threat to public 
health, safety, and general welfare evolved with time.  It took more than 
thirty years for the concept of blight, blighting conditions, and blighted dis-
tricts to become the underlying policy logic of urban redevelopment and 
the basis of positive findings for using eminent domain powers in pursuit of 
rebuilding the nation’s central cities.  The first step was taken in the 1920s 
and 1930s by the efforts of a few states3 and then the federal government to 
clear slums and build public housing.  This was followed by several pio-
neering state enabling acts in the 1940s4 designed to attract private enter-
prise to rebuild urban areas.  Then Title I of the 1949 Housing Act autho-
rizing the federal urban renewal program codified the policy logic of 
tearing down slums and building middle- and upper-income housing and 
structures for commerce and industry as urban redevelopment strategy.  To 
 
 2. See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 1880-1950, at 317-80 
(2001). 
 3. New York State led the way in 1926, and New Jersey followed shortly thereafter in 
1929.  In response to dire slum conditions (following the limiting lessons learned from 
tenement reform laws), New York’s legislators established laws granting eminent domain 
powers to private developers in exchange for specific regulatory conditions.  This led to the 
development of the Amalgamated Dwellings and Knickerbocker Village, among others, 
though this did not generate the scale of hoped for redevelopment. See Colin Gordon, 
Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of 
Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 310 (2004). 
 4. Maryland, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania were among the first, yet by the end of 
World War II, about twenty states had passed enabling acts and more would follow.  See 
FOGELSON, supra note 2, at 304. 
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promote their cause, the advocates of redevelopment, thinking long-term 
and tactically, framed blight as an economic drain on cities, not just a social 
liability.  Blighted areas had to be razed because, redevelopment advocates 
reasoned, they are “incipient slums” and a threat to the fiscal solvency of 
the city.5 
In his major treatise, the first comprehensive study of land values in a 
large city over an extended period of time, Homer Hoyt described blight as 
the natural result of economic and social change.  Referring to a three-mile 
belt of land in Chicago extending from the center city, known as the 
“Loop,” which “was once an area of new and vigorous growth in 1873 and 
an obsolete and blighted area in 1933,” he laid out the economic conse-
quences of decline: 
Thus land in what is now known as the blighted area yielded an income 
and had prospects of enhancement in value due to absorption by industry 
that it does not have in 1933.  Even in 1900, however, the returns from 
this class of property were capitalized at a high rate, so that the land val-
ues as whole had ceased to advance.6 
Hoyt went on to cite the close proximity of the vice section, and of “the 
advancing line of industries and warehouses” to what once were fashiona-
ble residential sections that were sliding downward and losing their social 
prestige.7  As a result of these changes in the pattern of the distribution of 
population and land values, Hoyt concluded that “blighted areas” were 
more difficult to reclaim because “obsolete improvements and diversified 
ownership” made them less competitive for redevelopment by market 
forces than new development on “tracts of virgin prairie” serviced by tran-
sit or commuter rail or accessible by automobile.8  Large sections of the 
city, for example, the packing plants on the South Side as well as areas on 
the North Side and near West Side, “seem to offer few attractions for resi-
dential development, unless reclamation of the blighted areas is to be at-
tempted on a grand scale.”9 
The facilitating feature of “blight” was that it was hard to know precisely 
what it was and therefore hard to define, yet this very vagueness would 
make it easy to find.  The phrases used in the 1930s to describe its condi-
tions unsurprisingly resonate with typical contemporary statutory criteria, 
 
 5. Id. at 349. 
 6. HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO: THE RELATION-
SHIP OF THE GROWTH OF CHICAGO TO THE RISE OF LAND VALUES, 1830-1933, at 202 
(2000). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 362. 
 9. Id. at 363. 
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pre- and post-Kelo: areas where property values are decreasing; where 
buildings have become obsolete; where fundamental repairs are not being 
made; where high vacancies exist; where economic development has been 
substantially retarded or normal development frustrated; or, where taxes do 
not pay for public services.  Commenting as early as 1918, a Philadelphian 
professional noted a blighted area “is a district which is not what it should 
be.”10  Decades later, under Robert Moses’ urban renewal machine as well 
as in cities all across the nation, what constituted a blighted area remained 
open to argument and debate. 
Whatever the actual merits, cities had good reasons to stretch the mean-
ing of blight, as Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn explained in Down-
town, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities:11 
Federal regulations that emphasized clearing the most unlivable areas 
conflicted with other rules requiring local renewal agencies to sell their 
cleared sites to private developers for rebuilding.  Few developers were 
willing to build in the heart of the slums.  Cities such as Newark tried in 
the early years of the program to plan middle-income housing in some of 
the worst parts of the city, only to discover that no developers were inter-
ested.  Soon city renewal directors were searching for “the blight that’s 
right”—places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract devel-
opers.12 
Because the federal government was picking up two-thirds of the cost to 
clear blighted and slum areas and write-down the cost of selling the land to 
developers,13 it would not have been unreasonable to expect government 
bureaucrats or congressional legislation to define the specifics of the urban 
renewal program and exercise control over what local agencies did with the 
grant monies.  Yet, Title I left these specifics to local governments and 
 
 10. William C. Stanton, Blighted Districts in Philadelphia, in PLANNING PROBLEMS OF 
TOWN, CITY, AND REGION 76, 76 (1918). 
 11. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN INC.: HOW AMERICA RE-
BUILDS CITIES 23 (1989). 
 12. Id. 
 13. To make the financing task easier for cities, the federal government allowed them to 
pay their share by building public works to serve a project area.  Under this option, the fed-
eral government would first share two-thirds of the cost of such items as new schools or 
street improvements for renewal projects, and second, accept these public works at full cost 
as part of a city’s required matching share.  In this way a renewal agency could use public 
works to pay for its entire share of a project and many did.  By 1968, the federal government 
was collecting only twelve cents of every local matching dollar in cash; the rest was all pub-
lic works and similar credits. See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 26-27.  The politi-
cal logic of this type of “costless” off-budget financing was a lesson cities took to heart in 
devising subsequent strategies to finance redevelopment once the federal government ended 
urban renewal in 1974.  See Lynne B. Sagalyn, Explaining the Improbable: Local Redeve-
lopment in the Wake of Federal Cutbacks, 56 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 429 (1990). 
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their redevelopment agencies, which were heavily influenced by downtown 
business interests and real estate developers.  This coupling formed the ba-
sis of a formidable and enduring redevelopment alliance between govern-
ment and business.  Federalism likewise prevailed in the definition and de-
termination of “blighted areas,” since the federal government deferred to 
the states, which enabled the redevelopment entities.  As historian Colin 
Gordon noted in his inclusive analysis of the definitional character of 
blight, “most states, in fact, stopped short of defining blight and instead of-
fered a descriptive catalogue of blighted conditions—often pasted verbatim 
from Progressive-era health or safety statutes.”14  And as has been noted by 
several scholars parsing the statues and definitional foundations of blight, 
the criteria necessary for positive findings of blight are broad in number; 
and “liberal,” “vague,” “ambiguous,” or open-ended and non-objective in 
determination.15 
However diverse the criteria range across state statutes, they potently 
combine with broad discretionary powers given to local redevelopment au-
thorities in determining blight.  The table below shows the prevalence of 
blighting criteria.  It is compiled from Hudson Hayes Luce’s analysis of the 
statutes in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, which 
groups the common characteristics of blight into twelve categories.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 312. 
 15. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that’s Right for California Redevelop-
ment Law, 52 HASTING L.J. 991 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that’s 
Right]; Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 
35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389 (2001); Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking 
About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895 (2006).  For a 
discussion of blight and tax increment financing (TIF), see generally Gordon, supra note 3; 
George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development: 
Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 
TULANE L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Lefcoe, After Kelo]; George Lefcoe, Redevelopment 
Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got To Do With It?, 17 REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803-51 
(2008) [hereinafter Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo]. 
 16. Luce’s analysis included Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, which are 
omitted from discussion herein.  See Luce, supra note 15. 
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Table 1. Pre-Kelo Incidence of Blight Criteria Across State Statutes (in-
cluding District of Columbia). 
Category Category of Blight Criteria 
Incidence in Statutes 
No. % 
1 Structural Defects 51 100% 
2 Health Hazards 49 96% 
3 Faulty or Obsolescent Planning 43 84% 
4 Taxation Issues 35 69% 
5 Lack of Necessary Amenities (impact-ing health and safety) 34 67% 
6 Condition of Title 31 61% 
7 Character of Neighborhood 12 25% 
8 Blighted Open Areas 12 24% 
9 Declared Disaster Area 11 22% 
10 Economic Use of Land 10 20% 
11 Vacancies 9 18% 
12 Physical or Geological Factors 7 14% 
Source: Compilation by authors from Luce, supra note 15, at 397-402. 
 
Several themes stand out: (1) Blight is commonly and intuitively defined 
by structural defects and health hazards in nearly every state statute.  Insuf-
ficient light, air, ventilation, and access to utilities, all typically associated 
with necessary standards of living, are also included as blight criteria in 
two-thirds of the statutes.  Condensed together, these criteria represent the 
police-power definition of blight, conditions that are a threat to public 
health and safety.  (2) Planning features, whether faulty or obsolescent (in-
cluding irregular or small-lot layout, insufficient street capacity, over-
crowding, lot areas covered by buildings, and insufficient green spaces, 
parks, or recreational facilities), define a second broad category that all but 
eight statutes include as a condition of blight.17  (3) Neighborhood charac-
ter or the presence of blighted open areas (large areas of undeveloped or 
vacant land) are far less common as criteria of blight; only thirteen sta-
tutes18 include neighborhood character, and only a different set of twelve19 
 
 17. The eight states are Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. at 395. 
 18. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah.  See id. at 399-400 nn.80-92. 
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include blighted open areas as a determinant.  (4) Criteria often cited for 
condemnation abuse—economic use of land20 and vacancies21 impacting 
private redevelopment efforts—are relatively infrequent as preconditions 
for a positive finding of blight; as of 2000, in only ten states (or twenty 
percent),22 New York among them,23 could the economic use of land quali-
fy as a condition of blight; only nine24 statutes admit vacancies as a quali-
fying condition.  In contrast, taxation25 and legal conditions26 are far more 
common blight criteria—sixty-nine and sixty-one percent, respectively.  
Though the common practice is to show evidence of as many blighting fac-
tors as possible, all but five states27 base a positive determination of blight 
on the presence of a single blighting factor.  Moreover, only seven states,28 
according to another analysis include any quantification in their designation 
of what is a blighted area.29 
What impact post-Kelo reform efforts would have on the statutory basis 
for positive findings of blight is discussed shortly, but the widely held con-
sensus among scholars and practitioners alike prior to the ruling was that 
“blight,” as Gordon phrased it, “has lost any substantive meaning as either 
 
 19. Alabama, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. See id. at 400 
nn.93-104. 
 20. Economic use of land includes arrested economic development, stagnant or unpro-
ductive character of land, loss of population, and improvement in value of land by place-
ment of development.  One might also include in this category, physical and geological fac-
tors that would make development by private enterprise uneconomical and infeasible. See 
id. at 396. 
 21. Vacancies include vacant and abandoned buildings, vacant lots, low percentage of 
occupancy in buildings, and high turnover rate for leased properties. See id. 
 22. The ten states are Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia. See id. at 401.  
 23. See id.  The New York statute that is applicable to municipalities, according to 
Luce’s review, includes nine of the twelve blight criteria, omitting only faulty or obsoles-
cent planning features, taxation issues, and condition of title. See New York Urban Devel-
opment Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS, §§ 6251-6285, 6260 (McKinney 2011). 
 24. Alabama, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Luce, supra note 15, at 402 nn.128-36. 
 25. Taxation issues include unpaid ad valorem property taxes, special assessment liabili-
ties exceeding the fair market value of the land, and insufficient tax revenues to cover the 
cost of services provided by the taxing authority. See id. at 395. 
 26. Condition of title factors include ownership of title vested in too many persons to 
allow economical development, title in the city or municipal government as a result of tax or 
other foreclosure, or inability to determine or find owner(s) of the land. See id. 
 27. The five states that require positive findings of more than one factor are Colorado, 
Kansas, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Utah. See id. at 403. 
 28. The seven states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, and South Dakota.  This will be discussed further infra. 
 29. Gordon, supra note 3, at 320 n.134. 
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a description of urban conditions or a target for public policy.”30  Referring 
to its usage for tax increment financing, he went on to say that: 
[B]light is less an objective condition than it is a legal pretext for various 
forms of commercial tax abatement that, in most settings, divert money 
from schools and county-funded social services.  Redevelopment policies 
originally intended to address unsafe or insufficient urban housing are 
now more routinely employed to subsidize the building of suburban shop-
ping malls.31 
It was one thing for the policy logic of urban redevelopment to use 
blight as a condition precedent for condemnation.  It was quite another for 
an off-budget financing strategy such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF) to 
appropriate liberal blight criteria and use it extensively as a basis for con-
demnation actions designed to enhance the fiscal fortunes of municipalities, 
as will be further discussed shortly.32  Nowhere was this more common 
than in California after passage of the tax-cutting voter initiative, Proposi-
tion 13, in 1978, which capped taxes on real property at one percent of the 
full cash value, restricted annual increases of assessed value of real proper-
ty to an inflation factor not to exceed two percent per year, and prohibited 
reassessment of a new base year value except for a change in ownership 
and completion of new construction.33  Using TIF for fiscally-driven rede-
velopment projects was not, as Professor George Lefcoe has claimed, li-
mited to California’s biggest and oldest cities.34  California redevelopment 
agencies have declared prime sites in affluent cities (even the entire town 
of affluent Coronado) blighted.  In a continuing critique, he explained that 
California’s statutory definition of blight: 
[I]s not just about fairness to the owners of property taken.  In California, 
redevelopment, particularly redevelopment intended to attract high vo-
lume retail, is a widely used way of boosting the city’s share of the state 
 
 30. Id. at 307. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 91-104. 
 33. Proposition 13, officially named the People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation, 
added Article 13A to the California Constitution.  Section 1(a) limits the tax rate for real 
estate: “The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one 
percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property.  The one percent (1%) tax to be col-
lected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties.”  
The proposition decreased property taxes by assessing property values at their 1975-76 val-
ue (Section 2(a)) and restricted annual increases of assessed value of real property to an in-
flation factor, not to exceed two percent per year (Section 2(b)).  It also prohibited reas-
sessment of a new base year value except for change in ownership or completion of new 
construction (Section 2(a)).  
 34. Id. 
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sales tax and of sequestering property tax money that would have gone to 
the counties, school districts, and other taxing entities.35 
Among those who looked long and hard at the definitional issues sur-
rounding the policy uses and abuses of the blight standard, it is hard to find 
much optimism for the notion that significant abuse reform could be ac-
complished through a definition of “blight.”  Crafting a definition that 
could break free of the risk of manipulation appeared elusive, however 
beneficial the intent.36 
Prior to Kelo, several states had enacted reforms aimed at curbing abuses 
arising from tabula rosa blight criteria.  These reforms included a reword-
ing of the descriptive criteria in order to avoid the “double-counting” of 
similar factors (Illinois37), the addition of new descriptive criteria (Mis-
souri38), a “check-list” formula (Illinois39 and California40), and a tighter 
definition of eligible properties by restricting land eligible for designation 
as a blighted area (primarily wetlands, vacant lands, and agricultural 
land).41  Yet these “reforms,” Gordon concluded: 
[D]o not change the fact that judgments as to things like “obsolescence,” 
“dilapidation,” or “deleterious land uses” remain highly subjective.  
Moreover, blight remains a designation sought by developers, and hence 
shaped not by public purpose, but by private interests seeking public sub-
sidies.  Finally, state level reforms remained spooked by the prospect of 
interstate disadvantage . . . .  Meaningful reform must address both the 
imprecision and ambiguities of existing blight definitions and the incen-
tives to twist those definitions created by fragmented federal and metro-
politan governance.42 
II.  THE HIERARCHY OF USES 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London,43 the 
nation has gone through a period of soul searching regarding the proper use 
 
 35. Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo, supra note 15, at 820.  
 36. See Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 
71 MO. L. REV. 721, 742 (2006). See generally Christopher S. Brown, Comment, Blinded by 
the Blight: A Search for a Workable Definition of “Blight” in Ohio, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 207 
(2004). 
 37. Gordon, supra note 3, at 335 n.256 (citing 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-
3(a)(1) (2003) (amending 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-3(a) (1999)). 
 38. See id. at 335 n.257 (citing S.B. 172, 92d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. § 99.805(7), (8) 
(Mo. 2003) (unenacted)). 
 39. See id. at 335, n.258. (citing 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1) (1999)). 
 40. See id. at 335, n.259. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (1999)). 
 41. See id. at 336, n.260. 
 42. See id. at 336-37. 
 43. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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of the power of eminent domain.  An essential question in this debate is 
“What is the right balance in eminent domain between governmental needs 
on the one hand and property owner rights on the other?” 
There is little contention with respect to governmental needs when the 
use to which the property being taken is a pure or quintessential public use.  
“Pure Public Uses” would include modes of transportation that remain in 
governmental hands, such as highways, local streets, subways, light transit, 
airports, municipal docks and ports, reservoirs, water tunnels, sewer sys-
tems, public libraries, public schools, prisons, and police facilities.  Pure 
Public Use would also include parks or other land that is owned by the 
government and open and accessible to the entire public at all times, even if 
a usage or entry fee is required. 
Just below Pure Public Use are facilities with uses that directly benefit 
the general public and are owned by the public sector, including many in 
the use category just described, but are operated by private companies.  
Government owned utility systems and transportation facilities44 that are 
developed and/or leased or licensed to private entities, or otherwise ma-
naged by them, fall into this category.  Private prisons that are owned by 
the federal, state, or local government would be included here as well.  
They are not open to the public (though neither are public prisons) and are 
operated for a profit by private companies, but they serve a clear govern-
mental purpose and payments come entirely from the government.  Moreo-
ver, the government determines who is going to be a “user,” i.e., who is to 
be incarcerated.45  Charter schools and other public schools managed by 
not-for-profit entities or private companies, likewise, would be included in 
this group.  Government owned but privately operated sports facilities can 
also be put in this category.  However, private pre-collegiate schools would 
not be included.  Tuition is paid by private persons; the private school de-
 
 44. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782 (Mich. 2004), the term “in-
strumentalities of commerce” is used.  It is taken from Justice Ryan’s dissent in Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 665 (1981). 
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court and courts in every state have upheld the use of emi-
nent domain for acquiring property for laying railroad track.  Likewise, courts ac-
cept the use of eminent domain for digging irrigation ditches and canals, piping 
oil, distributing artificial light and power, laying telephone wires, and laying 
coaxial cable and fiber optic lines. 
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale 
Based On Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60 (2006). 
 45. In addition, such private prisons can be financed with tax-exempt bonds. See Ass’n 
of State Corr. Administrators, ALTERNATIVES FOR FINANCING PRISON FACILITIES 4 (1999), 
available at 
http://www.asca.net/system/assets/attachments/2085/Alternatives_for_Financing_Prison_Fa
cilities-3.pdf?1296161869; Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359, 
383 n.81 (1996). 
GOLD&SAGALYN_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:02 PM 
1130 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
cides who shall gain entry, and although education has a general public 
benefit and purpose, the direct beneficiaries are not the public generally, 
but the students who attend (and their parents).  We will return to a discus-
sion of schools, at the university level, when we look at the public versus 
private benefits involved in the expansion of Columbia University.46 
The next level down in our hierarchy of public uses is privately owned 
utilities.  These are privately owned and run, but serve the public generally 
and are highly regulated by the government (through public service com-
missions) in order to assure adequate public service and fair rates.  This 
“Utility Use” category includes electric utilities, gas utilities, regulated wa-
ter companies, and telephone companies.  Utility companies are not go-
vernmental authorities or public benefit corporations; they are private com-
panies.  They, therefore, cannot be considered a Pure Public Use, but their 
purpose is so clearly for the benefit of the general public that condemnation 
on their behalf has long been established as constitutional.47  Condemna-
tions for Utility Use, while not totally free from all criticism rarely are 
challenged as not for a public use.48 
The second and third use groups, just described, each have private bene-
fits.  But it will be the ratio of public to private benefits that determines 
where on the hierarchy the use is placed.  As we move downward, this 
“public vs. private benefit ratio” (as we will call it) will be decreasing.  
There may be some projects with both large public benefits and large pri-
vate benefits, and some with small amounts of each.  For the purposes of 
the hierarchy proposed here, however, it is not the absolute amount of pub-
lic benefits that is determinative but rather the ratio between the public and 
private benefits that will determine its place in the hierarchy. 
Just below takings on behalf of privately run utilities are takings for 
“economic development” projects.  This “Economic Development Use” 
category is large, and needs to be divided into subcategories, which cover a 
spectrum of uses.  The highest form of Economic Development Use in-
cludes projects which will have maximum use of facilities by the general 
public and would include uses mentioned above, but are more likely to in-
clude uses to be mentioned as we discuss the different types.  They will 
 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. See, e.g., Bookhart v. Cent. Elec. Power Co-op., 219 S.C. 414, 420 (1951) (stating 
“‘The power of eminent domain usually is conferred by the legislature on electric light and 
power companies . . . and the erection, maintenance and operation of plants for generating 
electricity and distributing the same to the public for light, heat, or power ordinarily is re-
garded as a public use for which private property may be appropriated.’”) (citation omitted). 
 48. “Traditionally, courts have concluded that the use of eminent domain for aggregat-
ing thin, continuous pieces of land for private utility operations is a public use even for the 
primarily private objectives of private parties.” Kelly, supra note 44, at 59-60. 
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create large numbers of jobs, substantially increase taxes (property, income 
and sales), and provide maximum public benefits.  The best of these 
projects would also contain most or many of the following beneficial ele-
ments and procedural safeguards: (i) the initiating entity is the government; 
(ii) a careful plan for implementation is developed by the public sector and 
publicly vetted in accord with formal hearing procedures; (iii) the project 
could not be accomplished without condemnation (or the threat thereof); 
(iv) the private entities are selected in a carefully conducted competition 
governed under clear and publicly announced rules;49 (v) the private enti-
ties that will receive land for redevelopment will be accountable to the pub-
lic and the uses to which the land will be put will be adequately controlled 
by the public sector entity; and (vi) to the extent reasonably possible, there 
is adequate assurance that the project will be built in a timely fashion (and 
available remedies if it is not).  Requiring an “auction” is not appropriate 
because the procedure utilizes a simple comparison of a single number 
(e.g., the bid price for a land parcel or a fixed price contract) when the 
comparisons will, in fact, be of a number of factors related to the public ob-
jectives of land disposition and development, each of which will be given a 
weighting in the evaluation as is done in requests for proposals.  Although 
the government may turn the land and development opportunity over to one 
or more private entities to build and manage underground leases or deeds, 
typically a substantial number of stores and other facilities will be open for 
use by the general public.  The companies to whom the land is conveyed 
(by deed or lease) most often are private developers, and the designs, con-
struction, and uses would (ideally) be specified or approved by the go-
vernmental entity sponsoring the project using comprehensive provisions in 
the ground lease, or restrictive and affirmative covenants in the deed.  One 
of the characteristic features of such dispositions is ongoing involvement of 
the governmental entity during the development process.  This distinguish-
es these projects from both highest-bid auctions and regulatory interven-
tions.50  Remedies for failure to implement the proposed project in accor-
dance with a schedule, or otherwise in a timely fashion (subject to needed 
force majeure exceptions), could include increased security deposits, de-
designation for some or all parcels, liquidated penalties for lateness, loss of 
options, or a right to unwind project components. 
Today, the “Economic Development Use” category can, and often does, 
include mixed-use complexes of residences, offices, hotels, retail stores, 
 
 49. See Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URB. LAW. 
193, 229 (1987). 
 50. See generally Lynne B. Sagalyn, Public/Private Development: Lessons from Histo-
ry, Research, and Practice, 73 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 7-22 (2007). 
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and shopping centers.  Such large-scale projects, especially in downtown 
areas, would have been called urban renewal, slum clearance, or redeve-
lopment projects in the past, especially if they were undertaken in underde-
veloped or “blighted” areas.  Urban renewal projects also included con-
struction of government and civic buildings such as convention centers, 
hospitals, and educational buildings that are open to the public.  As we 
have discussed, the use of the term “blight” grew out of debates about slum 
clearance and legislative efforts to enact a federal urban renewal program, 
but it remains a highly significant precondition in undertaking economic 
development projects in many states today. 
The broad scope of potential uses in the Economic Development Use 
category today, in addition to those listed above, would also include mov-
ies, restaurants, activities for children, cultural activities, and other forms of 
entertainment, as well as, sports arenas and related facilities, convention 
centers, and even the occasional manufacturing facility, as in the case of 
the taking on behalf of General Motors in the infamous Poletown case.51  
Some are large and difficult to undertake.  They require governmental as-
sistance not just to assemble all the parcels (some of which may be public 
facilities) and eliminate holdouts, but also to add or rebuild infrastructure 
above and below ground (e.g., subways and pedestrian connections, utility 
systems, etc.).  The Times Square/42nd Street project, for example, revived 
a significant section of midtown Manhattan and freed it from the grip of 
drugs and other crimes.52  Other examples include Brooklyn’s MetroTech, 
and the original development of lower Manhattan’s World Trade Center. 
The size and variety of uses in economic development projects make 
them difficult to categorize.  The categories and hierarchy proposed here 
starts with maximum public use and maximum public benefit (through con-
tainment of the use and procedural elements outlined above) and then slides 
down from there.  Lesser amounts of public benefit and greater amounts of 
private benefit should (at least in theory) tend to lead to more opposition to 
the project, more lawsuits, and more scrutiny on the part of the courts.  But 
without a framework in the common or statutory law to work from, the 
courts have had little basis upon which to distinguish these (complex) 
projects, one from the other.  They lack determinants with which to draw 
lines or provide safeguards.  This is not a simple sliding scale; yet from one 
end of it to the other, there is a huge difference in the ratios of public to 
private benefits, which the law could do well to reflect. 
 
 51. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 
1981). 
 52. See generally LYNNE B. SAGALYN, TIMES SQUARE ROULETTE: REMAKING THE CITY 
ICON (2001).   
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Process and procedure becomes especially important to creating founda-
tional principles for these projects.  For example, the degree to which the 
government approaches a project with a “‘carefully considered develop-
ment plan’” that has been created without a private company already cho-
sen, or in mind, can become a factor in finding or not finding a public pur-
pose.53  The government’s development of a plan, internally from its own 
staff and resources, is good evidence of a public purpose.  Perhaps that is 
why in the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo together, the words 
“plan” and “planning” are mentioned nearly fifty times, as noted by Nicole 
Garnett.54  But it is not always possible to prepare a plan with such purity.  
To test interest and practicality it may be necessary to talk to, and solicit 
feedback from, the private sector, especially those who are most able to 
judge the practical economic feasibility of a government plan.  Such con-
tacts can be invaluable, but if condemnation is going to be needed, gov-
ernment officials need to recognize that such private sector involvement 
may create risk.  For the more input the private entities provide, the more 
likely the plan will reflect their thinking and needs, and this may skew the 
final plan toward a few such private parties, and possibly just one of them.  
The more tilt in that direction, the greater the appearance of a private pur-
pose, with the public purposes being called mere “pretext” and the taking, 
“pretextual.”  A problem with claims that the public benefits are serving as 
a “pretext”55 for the true purpose (i.e. benefits to private entities)56 is that 
economic development projects are almost never so black or white as this 
term and the term “pretextual” suppose.  Courts trying to apply this dichot-
omy will have to put each project into one of two boxes.  But, the vast ma-
jority of the projects they will be analyzing will not fit because they will 
contain quantities of both public and private benefits.  So notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court saying in Kelo that a showing of pretext is a valid basis 
for a public use challenge,57 it will be very difficult to make much use of 
this concept.  The Kelo Court seems to accept this when it also says “Quite 
simply, the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit in-
dividual private parties.”58  Also, practically speaking, a highly specialized 
 
 53. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (quoting Kelo v City of 
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)).  
 54. Nicole S. Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007). 
 55. Such an allegation was made in Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008), 
but was dismissed by the Second Circuit. 
 56. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Govern-
ments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 174 (2009). 
 57. “Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public 
purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
 58. Id. at 485. 
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plan with unique requirements might result in fewer bidders or greater en-
tanglement with the preferred private entities, particularly in the absence of 
very carefully established procedures and safeguards for the selection of 
the developers. 
In Kelo, plaintiffs alleged that the role of the private pharmaceutical 
company, Pfizer, whose research facility would constitute a major compo-
nent of New London’s plan, turned it into a project with a private pur-
pose.59  The Justices of the Supreme Court struggled with Pfizer’s role, and 
to a lesser extent with that of the developer, Corcoran Jennison.  The Court 
found that the developer’s role came relatively late, but that Pfizer’s inter-
est appeared at the outset.  Justice Kennedy, in concurring, observed that 
the developer was chosen out of a group of applicants, and also found that 
benefiting Pfizer did not appear to be the primary motivation of the propos-
al.60  In fact, though, Pfizer’s interest in developing a Pfizer facility pre-
dated the project.61  Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion, found the 
New London plan to be “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corpora-
tion.”62  The majority, however, ultimately deferred to the trial court’s find-
ing that there was “no evidence of an illegitimate purpose” and concluded 
that the plan was not adopted to “benefit a particular class of identifiable 
individuals.”63 
After the case was decided, a Freedom of Information Act request by the 
New London newspaper The Day showed that the condemnations were 
taken “in large part as a result of extensive Pfizer lobbying of state and lo-
cal officials” in connection with its offer to build a new headquarters in 
New London.64  We can only speculate if this would have made any differ-
ence had it been fully known to the five Justices who decided in favor of 
New London. 
Moving down the hierarchy within the Economic Development Use 
group would be projects where the initiative is a joint one between the gov-
ernment and a developer.  The government or the developer may have had 
the initial idea for the development.  The developer might be interested due 
to the location and/or because the project is geared to their special capacity 
and experience.  The developer may also be, or become, interested because 
of the government assistance that it believes is available.  This description 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 492. 
 61. Id. at 473. 
 62. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 478 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
 64. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings 
After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 236 (2007); Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on 
the Fort Trumbull Plan, THE NEW LONDON DAY, Oct. 16, 2005. 
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fits the Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn, a multi-billion dollar, twenty-
two acre project in downtown Brooklyn that includes large amounts of 
housing and retail space, a new basketball arena, and public open space.  
The project was originally conceived by Bruce Ratner and his Forest City 
Ratner Companies and was driven by them.  It was then assisted by the 
New York State Urban Development Corporation, which does business as 
the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), and turned it into a 
jointly managed project.  The Second Circuit noted this origin and com-
pared the case to New London’s project, saying “unlike in Kelo, the Atlan-
tic Yards Project was allegedly proposed in the first instance by Ratner 
himself.”65  But the Second Circuit, rather than trying to determine how the 
Supreme Court, post-Kelo, would have come out on these facts, instead fo-
cused on two public purpose factors, both of which the appellants had con-
ceded: first, that the Project targets a long-blighted area, and second, that 
the Project had substantial public benefits in the form of a publically-
owned arena (for an NBA basketball team), public open space, substantial 
affordable housing, and improvements to the mass transit system.  It played 
down the private benefits to Ratner by finding that appellants “failed to al-
lege any specific examples of illegality” or “any specific illustration of im-
proper dealings between Mr. Ratner and the pertinent government offi-
cials.”66  On the charge that the private benefits and pretext were worse 
than in Kelo because Ratner proposed and drove the whole Project, the 
Second Circuit cited New York law: “However, here, New York long ago 
decided by statute not to restrict the ESDC’s mandate to those ‘projects in 
which it is the prime mover.’”67 
It then rejected the request of appellants for a “full judicial inquiry into 
the motivation” of officials who supported the Project as being “an exercise 
as fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties as with state-
sovereignty, and separation-of-power concerns.”68  The Second Circuit also 
noted that in New York the removal of blight is a fully separate leg upon 
which public purpose can be based, without regard to the uses to be made 
of the site.  The court cited its own decision in the Times Square project 
case,69 to state the same principle illustrated by Berman and Rosenthal, that 
 
 65. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. (quoting N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2007) (directing the ESDC to 
“encourage[e] maximum participation by the private sector of the economy”); E. Thirteenth 
St. Cmty. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Hous. Fin. Agency, 218 A.D.2d 512, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1995)). 
 68. Id. at 63. 
 69. Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
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“the redevelopment of [a] blighted area,” even standing alone, represents a 
“classic example of a taking for a public use.”70  It thereby joined other 
New York decisions that place New York in an even more favorable posi-
tion for government exercise of eminent domain power than Berman and 
Kelo would.71 
Whether the initial idea is from the government or the private sector, 
New York State and New York City agencies may decide to use a joint ap-
proach with the private sector because their projects are heavily site specif-
ic and often (at least in New York City) need to be shoe-horned into a 
dense and already developed location.  This is done also because of the 
time and costs involved in the many steps that need to be surmounted in the 
approval process.  Having a developer in tow helps craft a detailed project 
and make it adequately specific for full environmental review under the 
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and City Environmen-
tal Quality Review (CEQR).  The Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 
required by these laws cost many hundreds of thousands of dollars and can 
go over a million dollars, so it helps to have a deep-pocket entity commit-
ted to a project early on that can foot the bill.  A draft EIS is needed before 
the City Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP) can start, a process 
that generally takes half a year or longer.  The City or State may also solicit 
the City’s planning department jointly with the developer to obtain zoning 
changes needed for the proposed project. 
Consequently, where the original idea comes from is not as important as 
how the idea is used, and what the results turn out to be.  The project may 
be improved with input from private entities.  It may become more likely to 
be successful, and it may also be better able to obtain necessary financing.  
It might also include more components that make it operate better.  So the 
number of contacts between the public and private sectors may not always 
be evidence of contrivance or the bending of all benefit toward the private 
sector.  The key is the project itself, i.e., the ratio of public benefits to pri-
vate sector benefits.  In economic development projects, private sector 
companies or developers almost always play a role.  But we must assess 
whether the facilities to be built are just for the use and benefit of those 
same companies?  In this regard, the relative inclusion of public uses, open 
space, recreational facilities, and better public transportation connections 
do count; and retail space counts more than general office space, and both 
are likely to generate more public benefits than would a facility for a single 
company. 
 
 70. Id. at 46. 
 71. The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 
554 U.S. 930 (2008). 
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So located somewhat further down the Economic Development Use lad-
der (offering fewer public benefits and containing less than all of the ele-
ments listed above) are projects where the initiative comes from a private 
company and it seeks to build a new facility solely for itself.  To get go-
vernmental assistance, the company will typically offer more jobs than cur-
rently exist and/or a better tax base once the project is completed.  The 
company may threaten to leave the city if it does not receive the assistance 
and/or subsidies it seeks.  In some cases these elements may be combined.  
Big box location projects and single manufacturer expansion projects are 
such examples.  The General Motors plan in Poletown is also a good ex-
ample.  In the Poletown case, Detroit was threatened by General Motors re-
locating one of its factories out of the City unless the City provided it with 
a site for a new factory.72  The City, fearful of the loss, condemned several 
hundred acres in a residential area known as Poletown to satisfy GM’s re-
quirements.  The City used eminent domain to assemble that site following 
approval of the Project by the Michigan Supreme Court.  A thousand 
homes and businesses were lost.  And in the end, the factory GM built gen-
erated fewer jobs and less revenue than had been predicted by the City.73  
Subsequently the Michigan Supreme Court reversed itself and overruled 
Poletown.74 
Relying entirely on the test used in the Poletown dissent and describing 
their decision as a return to the law as it existed before Poletown, the Mich-
igan Supreme Court found the application of eminent domain unconstitu-
tional because: (1) the condemnations were not strictly necessary for the 
realization of the public benefit as is the case with privately built roads or 
railroads; (2) the private entity that would receive the condemned land was 
not sufficiently accountable to the public for the use of the land; and (3) 
there were no other facts of “public significance,” such as blight elimina-
tion, which justified the takings as a public use.75 
 
 72. Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 
1981). 
 73. See Somin, supra note 64, at 194-95. 
 74. Because Poletown’s conception of a public use – that of “alleviating unem-
ployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community” has no support in 
the Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence before the Constitution’s ratification, 
its interpretation of “public use” in art. 10, § 2 [of the Michigan constitution] can-
not reflect the common understanding of that phrase among those sophisticated in 
the law at ratification.  Consequently, the Poletown analysis provides no legiti-
mate support for the condemnations proposed in this case and, for the reasons 
stated above, is overruled. 
Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004). 
 75. See id. at 770-71. 
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In Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris,76 the New York 
Court of Appeals reviewed the question of whether a taking by the Com-
munity Development Agency of Yonkers for the expansion of the Otis Ele-
vator Company was for a public purpose.  Otis was chosen as the sponsor 
before any public hearings were held.  Otis had also indicated it would 
leave Yonkers if suitable land was not found for its expansion.  The con-
demned land was adjacent to Otis’ existing facilities.  The City had signed 
an agreement with Otis before the condemnation of the land.  The court ex-
plained that given Otis’s ongoing economic importance to the community, 
these actions should be regarded as “mere irregularities cured by the fact 
that the hearings were actually held.”77  The court also found unremarkable 
the fact that Otis would get the condemned land for a price which is “a 
fraction of that paid to the defendants and the other owners in condemna-
tion.”78 
The Community Development Agency maintained that the land taken 
was substandard.  Land found to be blighted or substandard, the court said, 
can be taken for urban renewal projects in New York without there being a 
separate public purpose “just as it would be if it were taken for a public 
park, public school or public street.”79  On the other hand, the court noted 
“if property has not been determined to be substandard in an urban renewal 
context, it may not be taken in eminent domain unless it is proved that its 
taking was for another public purpose and, if there was also a private bene-
fit involved, that the public purpose was dominant.”80 
When it turned to the question of whether blight data or facts supporting 
the determination had been provided, incredibly enough, it found that none 
had been provided: 
Here, other than the agency’s bare pleading of its “substandard” finding, it 
provided no further data as to the condition of the area, except for the 
general statement that at least 50% of the structures in the area are “subs-
tandard,” a figure which, as defendants point out, did no more than coin-
cide with the figure found in an earlier comprehensive city plan . . . .  The 
agency has not indicated in any manner the grounds upon which it con-
cluded that the land is presently substandard.81 
Yet, the court held for the condemning Agency.  Their basis for so hold-
ing was that the condemned landowners did not adequately raise the issue 
 
 76.  37 N.Y.2d 478 (1975). 
 77. Id. at 482. 
 78. Id. at 483. 
 79. Id. at 482. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 484-85. 
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of the “quality of the land taken” although it conceded that they did state 
that it was “not substandard.”  The court asserted that the landowners “sub-
ordinated” the substandard issue to their argument that benefitting a large 
manufacturer, Otis Elevator, was not a public purpose.  This was probably 
done because there were no facts or data that they could dispute, and be-
cause they were aware that agency findings of blight were not subject to 
court reversal.82  Because of their “subordination of a valid issue” and be-
cause the taking had already occurred, the court held that the defendants 
were not entitled to relief.83 
We believe that this decision should no longer be followed.  The project 
originated with one company, albeit an important one to the City, solely for 
its own benefit, together with a threat to leave the City if it did not get its 
way.  In addition, it received substantial land price subsidies.  If the Court 
was relying on job creation for finding public purpose, it failed to show 
any: no job data is provided.  The word “jobs” is not mentioned even once 
in the decision.  What the court said on this point (in one of its many “if we 
assume” sentences) is: 
Therefore, if we assume that the land here involved was substandard, as 
found by the Yonkers City Council and its Planning Board, it would be no 
defense to its condemnation that Otis openly expressed a desire to acquire 
it to assure its own continued economic viability in Yonkers.  It would not 
then be necessary, as a precondition to the taking, to determine that the 
public benefit in assuring the retention of Otis as an increased source of 
employment opportunity in Yonkers was sufficient to outweigh the bene-
fit that may be conferred on Otis.84 
Since they subsequently conclude that there was in fact was no support 
for the Agency’s claim of blight, the assumption does not hold, and it 
would therefore be necessary (in the court’s own words) “as a precondition 
to the taking” to show that the public benefit outweighs the private benefit.  
But there is no such showing, nor any discussion of the matter.  Even the 
court’s simple reference to retention of Otis as an increased employment 
“opportunity” is not supported with a single sentence.  And, the concept of 
accountability to the public for the use of the land (included in the Michi-
gan Supreme Court’s decision in Hathcock discussed above) which here 
would require some level of assurance of actual job creation (through e.g., 
binding agreements and penalties) appears to have been beyond the horizon 
of thought in the development of the Project or the thinking of the court.  
 
 82. The landowners thought they would have to lose on the blight issue because of the 
“omnipotence” they believed urban renewal agencies had with respect to it. Id. at 486. 
 83. Id. at 487. 
 84. Id. at 482. 
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The facts in this 1975 case do not provide the minimum ratio of public to 
private benefits needed for constitutionality. 
Toward the bottom of our hierarchy are: (1) so-called one-to-one trans-
fers in which a single company benefits to the disadvantage of another in-
dividual corporation through the help of the government; (2) projects done 
solely to obtain a tax benefit with no meaningful change in use or other 
significant public benefit; and (3) tax increment financings (TIF). 
The first group in this category, one-to-one transfers, engenders many 
lawsuits; and it is more likely that the courts will put their collective feet 
down here because there is relatively little public benefit and in a number 
of cases a strong appearance, or reality, of private benefit.  This is particu-
larly true when the benefited company has an alternative that does not re-
quire eminent domain.  For example, in 99 Cents Only Stores85 and South-
western Illinois Development Authority (SWIDA),86 the courts found other 
reasonable options to be available, and held both takings to be unconstitu-
tional.  In the first case, 99 Cents Only, Costco wished to expand one of its 
stores and demanded that the redevelopment agency condemn a leasehold 
interest to provide for the expansion.  The district court found that Costco 
could have expanded on its own by simply going in another direction.87  In 
the SWIDA case, a racetrack sought to expand, at the expense of a neigh-
bor’s recycling facility, so it could have more land for parking.  The court 
found that the construction of a garage by the racetrack would solve its pri-
vate need and that eminent domain was not available.88  There are many 
other cases with the same result.89 
The most typical cases in the second group, tax-enhancement projects, 
include projects that assist the development of big box retail stores like 
Wal-Mart, Costco, Home Depot, and large drug stores and could be called 
“big box projects” or “suburban mall projects.”  The local municipality’s 
purpose is principally to increase property and sales taxes.  However, some 
communities assist the big box builders out of fear that if they do not get 
the store in their jurisdiction, the store will move to a neighboring town, 
provide no benefits and do harm to the smaller stores in town that will find 
 
 85. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 
2001). 
 86. Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. (SWIDA) v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002). 
 87. See 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 
 88. See SWIDA, 768 N.E.2d at 10.  
 89. See, e.g., Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granted a preliminary injunction blocking the use of condemnation 
for development of a discount retailer, expected to be Costco, at the expense of church seek-
ing to build a 4,700 seat auditorium with surrounding buildings); Baily v. Myers, 76 P.3d 
898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
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it difficult to compete.  In addition to condemning land for the store, some-
times the municipality uses condemnation powers to construct connecting 
exits and entrances to the nearest highways in order to facilitate the in-
creased road traffic that will be generated.  One of the worst examples of 
overreach in the tax-enhancement category comes out of a project in a 
middle-class suburb of Cleveland named Lakewood.  In an attempt to en-
hance its taxes, Lakewood officials and developers agreed to develop a 
shopping mall and an upscale residential facility.  A blight finding was re-
quired to acquire properties in a portion of the project area with owner-
occupied homes.  To be able to make the finding, homes without three bed-
rooms, an attached two-car garage, and central air-conditioning could be 
declared blighted.  Legal and political battles ensued, and the town in a bal-
lot initiative finally put an end to the whole project.90 
In the third group, TIF projects, the local public development agency is-
sues bonds to create improved infrastructure or facilities within a designat-
ed district.  Condemnation is used to facilitate a private-enterprise devel-
opment and these new improvements generate increasing property taxes 
that are used to pay both interest and principal on the bonds.  The munici-
pality does not receive the property taxes generated by the project until the 
bonds are completely paid off, but neither will it need to use any of its own 
on-budget financial resources for the project.  These projects are controver-
sial for several reasons, including the segregation of property tax revenues 
for one bond issuance, and the conveyance of land to a private firm or firms 
for narrow economic development purposes.  While the bond proceeds help 
create infrastructure improvements, the improvements are generally tar-
geted toward the private betterments.91 
Local governments have strong incentives to undertake TIF projects.92  
TIF projects involve little or no direct financial risk for the local govern-
ment (which has generally no legal obligation to repay the debt unless it 
has contractually obligated itself) and because the debt does not, in most 
states, count against local debt limits, they can increase the share of tax 
revenues dedicated to their municipal purposes.  The TIF may also leverage 
federal dollars.  If a finding of blight is required, it is typically under a sta-
tute that has a broad definition of blight.93  In fact, in TIF statutes, the 
 
 90. See Pritchett, supra note 15, at 911-12; see also Blaine Harden, In Ohio, A Test for 
Eminent Domain: Rights vs. Renewal at Stake in Case, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at A03; 
Bert Gall, Beating Bogus ‘Blight’ in Lakewood, Ohio, 13 LIBERTY & L., Apr. 2004, 
http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/2004/13_2_04_b.html. 
 91. See generally Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment 
Financing on Economic Development, 47 J. URBAN ECON. 306-28 (2000). 
 92. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 315; Lefcoe, After Kelo, supra note 15, at 59-64. 
 93. See Lefcoe, After Kelo, supra note 15, at 59.  
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“states definition of blight are so broad and vague that they could apply to 
practically every neighborhood in the country.”94  Goshorn, Gordon, and 
Lefcoe cite the Missouri and Ohio statutes as good examples of such sta-
tutes.95  The Missouri statute, for example, includes unsanitary and unsafe 
conditions, the existence of conditions that endanger property by fire or 
other causes, or retards the provision of housing accommodations, or con-
stitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to public health, morals, 
or welfare.96  The Ohio statute includes age of the building, obsolescence, 
incompatible land use relationships, and excessive dwelling unit density.97  
Both include “inadequate street layout.”  Statutes like these are written to 
allow blight findings to be made easily, so projects can be authorized.  In 
addition, compliance with the statutory definition is left to the same agen-
cies that form and administer the TIF.98 
California initiated the use of TIFs in the early 1950s to generate match-
ing funds for federal urban renewal projects when voters turned down local 
bond initiatives.99  Economic pressures then pushed the vast majority of 
states to enact their own TIF statutes, and after the federal government shut 
down its urban renewal program in 1974, TIF grew dramatically in impor-
tance to become the dominant means by which cities funded their urban re-
vitalization and economic development ambitions.100  Though the linkage 
between an area’s TIF potential and its blight was usually weak, TIF sta-
tutes nevertheless would draw heavily on “blight” findings.  Older statutory 
definitions of blight based on public health, safety, and welfare taken from 
urban contexts were expanded to accommodate the new economic devel-
opment projects with concepts like insufficient tax generation, slow eco-
nomic growth, and under-utilization of the land, as in the Missouri and 
Ohio statutes.101  In the process, blight requirements were converted from 
restrictive standards into very broad standards so as to intentionally facili-
tate these projects and any condemnations that might be required.  Local 
governments beguiled by the prospect of capturing federal grants or a larg-
 
 94. Id. (citing Dana Berliner, The Condemnation Landscape Across the Country Post 
Kelo, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND-VALVE LITIGATION, 
433, 439 (2007)). 
 95. Gordon, supra note 3, at 314; Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax 
Increment Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 922-26 (1999); Lefcoe, After Kelo, 
supra note 15, at 59-61. 
 96. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2008). 
 97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1728.01 (2001). 
 98. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful 
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 722-25. 
 99. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 313; Goshorn, supra note 95, at 925.   
 100. See Goshorn, supra note 95, at 925; Sagalyn, supra note 13, at 429-41. 
 101. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 314, 318; Goshorn, supra note 95, at 929-30. 
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er tax base have every incentive to define blight expansively.102  Local of-
ficials and developers and other private enterprises, in close working rela-
tionships, have made good use of these expansive, vague statutes103 and 
court review has been minimal, with rejections being the rare exception.104 
III.  BLIGHT AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN COLUMBIA’S EXPANSION IN 
MANHATTANVILLE 
The planned condemnation of land to create a third campus for Colum-
bia University in the Manhattanville section of Harlem was held to be con-
stitutional by the New York Court of Appeals,105 reversing a decision of 
the Appellate Division106 that held it to be unconstitutional.  Columbia’s 
main campus in Morningside Heights, Manhattan, is surrounded by intense 
development which effectively walls the campus and prevents expansion.  
Columbia has been seeking to expand and add to its research and graduate 
school programs.  Without this growth, it and the State believe, it cannot 
maintain its position as one of the leading educational and cultural institu-
tions in the world.107  Columbia’s square footage per student, at three hun-
dred twenty-six gross square feet per student, is lower than any of its peer 
institutions.108 
To assist Columbia, the Empire State Development Corporation 
(ESDC), acting for the State of New York on the seventeen-acre Project, 
authorized the Project under its General Project Plan as both a “land use 
improvement project,” which required a finding of blight, and as a “civic 
project,” which required no finding of blight.  As a result, the Appellate 
Division had to grapple with two major issues.  One was the finding of 
blight, and the other was whether the use of eminent domain for a single 
educational entity is for a public purpose.  The focus under the “civic 
project” basis for authorization was whether the use of eminent domain for 
the sole benefit of Columbia University, a private institution of higher 
learning and research, was a public purpose.  On this issue, the Appellate 
Division firmly held no: 
 
 102. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 315; see also Goshorn, supra note 95, at 923. 
 103. Gordon, supra note 3, at 315.  
 104. Gordon, supra note 3, at 323; Sandefur, supra note 98, at 725. 
 105. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 235 (2010). 
 106. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 72 A.D.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 107. See generally N.Y. STATE URBAN DEV. CORP. D/B/A EMPIRE STATE DEV. CORP., CO-
LUMBIA UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY EDUCATIONAL MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT, LAND USE IM-
PROVEMENT & CIVIC PROJECT GENERAL PROJECT PLAN (2008).   
 108. Id. at 10. 
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The use of eminent domain should also be rejected on the grounds that 
Columbia’s expansion is not a “civic project.” . . .  The petitioners cor-
rectly contend that within the definition of Unconsolidated Laws § 6253 
(6)(d) (UDCA § 3 [6][d]), a private university does not constitute facili-
ties for a “civic project.” . . .  Here, Columbia is virtually the sole benefi-
ciary of the Project.  This alone is reason to invalidate the condemnation 
especially where, as here, the public benefit is incrementally incidental to 
the private benefits of the Project.109 
The Court of Appeals in Kaur had a very different view of the value of 
the University’s expansion.  In connection with the Appellate Division’s 
determination that the expansion of a private university does not qualify as 
a “civic purpose,” the Court of Appeals found that, “[t]his conclusion [of 
the Appellate Division] does not have statutory support.  Indeed, there is 
nothing in the statutory language limiting a proposed educational project to 
public educational institutions.”110  The Court of Appeals went on to argue 
that: 
The proposed Project here is at least as compelling in its civic dimension 
as the private [Atlantic Yards] development in Matter of Develop Don’t 
Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp. 874 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dept 
2009)).  Unlike the Nets basketball franchise, Columbia University, 
though private, operates as a nonprofit educational corporation.  Thus, the 
concern that a private enterprise will be profiting through eminent domain 
is not present.  Rather, the purpose of the Project is unquestionably to 
promote education and academic research while providing public benefits 
to the local community.  Indeed, the advancement of higher education is 
the quintessential example of a “civic purpose” (see Cornell Univ. v Bag-
nardi, 68 NY2d 583, 593 (1986) (recognizing that schools, both public 
and private, “serve the public’s welfare and morals”)).  It is fundamental 
that education and the expansion of knowledge are pivotal government in-
terests.  The indisputably public purpose of education is particularly vital 
for New York City and the State to maintain their respective statuses as 
global centers of higher education and academic research.111 
The argument being made is that benefiting a not-for-profit educational 
corporation is not benefiting private enterprise, therefore the use of emi-
nent domain for such an institution is not for a private purpose.  Education 
and the generation of knowledge are “government interests,” thus making 
their expansion a public purpose.  The degree to which the general public 
benefits from the expansion of a renowned university obviously depends on 
one’s own values and perception of what such universities do.  Yet it 
 
 109. Kaur, 72 A.D.3d at 20. 
 110. Kaur, 15 N.Y.3d at 258. 
 111. Id. 
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should be accepted by most everyone that a public university would be 
more deserving of the application of eminent domain for an expansion than 
would be the case for a private college or university.  To make findings of 
public purpose for the Project as a whole more certain, the Project, as the 
Court of Appeals noted, also includes two acres of “park-like and 
landscaped space,” upgrades to transit infrastructure, financial assistance to 
a small new park on Hudson River, and the creation of a large number of 
construction and permanent jobs—calling these “civic benefits.”112 
We have already noted that the removal of blight in New York is itself a 
public purpose and can therefore be the sole basis for the use of eminent 
domain.  Since Yonkers,113 the courts have recognized blight as an inde-
pendent basis for condemnation on the grounds that: 
[T]he removal of urban blight is a proper, and, indeed, constitutionally 
sanctioned, predicate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.  It 
has been deemed a “public use” within the meaning of the State Constitu-
tion’s Takings Clause at least since Muller,114 and is expressly recognized 
by the Constitution as a ground for condemnation.115 
Blight determinations in New York by the ESDC are not based on a strict 
definition provided by its statute,116 but on case law.  The application and 
practice is quite expansive.  The expansive result is not all that dissimilar to 
that with TIF statutes that have extremely broad definitions of blight.117  
 
 112. See id. 
 113. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478 (1975). 
 114. In re N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333 (1936). 
 115. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 13 N.Y.3d 511, 524 (2009). 
 116. New York Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS, §§ 6251-
6285, 6260.  For a land use improvement project, the Corporation must find: 
1) That the area in which the project is to be located is a substandard or insanitary 
area, or is in danger of becoming a substandard or insanitary area and tends to im-
pair or arrest the sound growth and development of the municipality; 
2) That the project consists of a plan or undertaking for the clearance, replanning, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of such area and for recreational and other facili-
ties incidental or appurtenant thereto; 
3) That the plan or undertaking affords maximum opportunity for participation by 
private enterprise, consistent with the sound needs of the municipality as a whole. 
Id. at § 6260(c)(1)-(3). 
 117. In Yonkers, the Court of Appeals established the following palette of possibilities for 
findings of blight in New York: 
Many factors and interrelationships of factors may be significant. These may in-
clude such diverse matters as irregularity of the plots, inadequacy of the streets, 
diversity of land ownership making assemblage of property difficult, incompati-
bility of the existing mixture of residential and industrial property, overcrowding, 
the incidence of crime, lack of sanitation, the drain an area makes on municipal 
services, fire hazards, traffic congestion, and pollution.  It can encompass areas in 
the process of deterioration or threatened with it as well as ones already rendered 
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Abetting and encouraging this loose approach is the deference given by the 
courts to the definitions and determinations made by the condemning agen-
cies.  New York courts generally cite the State Constitution118 to take the 
position that, “[t]he Constitution accords government broad power to take 
and clear substandard and insanitary areas for redevelopment.  In so doing, 
it commensurately deprives the Judiciary of grounds to interfere with the 
exercise.”119 
But in Columbia’s Manhattanville project, the Appellate Division under-
took a thorough review of the ESDC blight findings.  The Appellate Divi-
sion was able to find language in prior cases to support a review by it of the 
ESDC findings: 
 
useless, prevention being an important purpose.  It is “something more than dete-
riorated structures.  It involves improper land use.  Therefore its causes, originat-
ing many years ago, include not only outmoded and deteriorated structures, but 
unwise planning and zoning, poor regulatory code provisions, and inadequate pro-
visions for the flow of traffic.” 
Yonkers, 37 N.Y.2d at 483 (quoting John F. Cook, Battle Against Blight, MARQ. L. REV. 
444, 445 (1960)).  The courts in New York rely on this language in the absence of a codified 
definition of blight. Kaitlyn Piper, Note, New York’s Fight Over Blight: The Role of Eco-
nomic Underutilization in Kaur, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1149, 1157 (2010). 
 118. “Subject to the provision of this article, the legislature may provide in such manner, 
by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe for . . . the clearance, 
replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas, or for both 
such purposes, and for recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto.” 
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (amended 1965).   New York’s General Municipal Law has its 
own definitions: 
(a) “Blighted area” means an area within a municipality in which one or more of 
the following conditions exist: (i) a predominance of buildings and structures 
which are deteriorated or unfit or unsafe for use or occupancy; or (ii) a predomin-
ance of economically unproductive lands, buildings or structures, the redevelop-
ment of which is needed to prevent further deterioration which would jeopardize 
the economic well being of the people; and 
 
(g) “Project area” means an area of a community that is a blighted area, the rede-
velopment of which is necessary to effectuate the purposes of this article.  A 
project area need not be restricted to buildings, improvements or lands that are de-
trimental or inimical to the public health, safety or welfare, but may consist of an 
area in which such conditions predominate and adversely affect the entire area.  A 
project area may include lands, buildings or improvements which are not detri-
mental or inimical to the public health, safety or welfare, but whose inclusion is 
found necessary by the municipality for the effective redevelopment of the area of 
which they are a part.  All lands, buildings or improvements included in a project 
area shall be necessary for effective redevelopment and shall not be included for 
the purposes of obtaining the allocation of tax increment revenue without clear 
justification for their inclusion.  A project area shall not include land utilized for 
agricultural production. 
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-c(a), (g). 
 119. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 235, 253 (2010). 
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[E]ven where the law expressly defines the removal or prevention of 
‘blight’ as a public purpose and leaves to the agencies wide discretion in 
deciding what constitutes blight, facts supporting such determination 
should be spelled out.” (Quoting from Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. 
Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 484 (1975), appeal dismissed 423 U.S. 1010 
(1975).  Furthermore, “[c]arefully analyzed, it is clear that in such situa-
tions, courts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determina-
tion of the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condem-
nation cases.  The findings of the agency are not self-executing.  A 
determination of public purpose must be made by the courts themselves 
and they must have a basis on which to do so.”  (Quoting from Yonkers, 
37 N.Y.2d at 485; see Matter of City of Brooklyn [Long Is. Water Supply] 
143 N.Y. 596, 618 (1894), affd 166 U.S. 685 (1897) (“But whether the 
use, for which the property is to be taken, is a public use, which justifies 
its appropriation, is a judicial question; upon which the courts are free to 
decide”).120 
Once they had determined that they had standing to review the findings, 
they dove in with gusto, providing a judicial view of blight findings not 
generally seen in New York, stating “the blight designation in the instant 
case is mere sophistry.  It was utilized by ESDC years after the scheme was 
hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain, but this Project has 
always primarily concerned a massive capital project for Columbia.”121 
Instead of deferring to the State Constitution and prior court decisions in 
New York thereon, they analyzed Kelo, comparing the facts in the two cas-
es and picking up on Justice Kennedy’s language in his concurring opinion 
in Kelo. 
Justice Kennedy specifically acknowledged that, “[t]here may be private 
transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of pri-
vate parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of in-
validity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”  Although he declined 
to conjecture as to what sort of case might justify a more demanding stan-
dard of scrutiny, beyond finding the estimated benefits there not “de mi-
nimis,” it was the specific aspects of the New London planning process 
that convinced him to side with the majority in deference to the legislative 
determination.122 
Then they compared the two projects for favoritism and the degree to 
which the projects were driven by and controlled by the beneficiary of the 
condemnation: 
 
 120. Kaur, 72 A.D.3d at 10. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 13 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005)). 
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The contrast between ESDC’s scheme for the redevelopment of Manhat-
tanville and New London’s plan for Fort Trumbull could not be more 
dramatic.  Initially, it must be noted that unlike Fort Trumbull, Manhat-
tanville or West Harlem as a matter of record was not in a depressed eco-
nomic condition when EDC [New York City Economic Development 
Corporation] and ESDC embarked on their Columbia-prepared and- fi-
nanced quest.  The 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that not only 
was Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but 
that the area had great development potential that could easily be realized 
through rezoning.  Again, its bears repeating that the only purportedly un-
biased or untainted study that concluded that Manhattanville was blighted, 
and thus in need of redevelopment, was not completed until 2008: the 
point at which the ESDC/Columbia steamroller had virtually run its 
course to the fullest.123 
The Appellate Division found that since the sole purpose of the State and 
City’s assistance to the project was to provide for the University’s expan-
sion, they were acting to implement a private purpose: 
Indeed, Columbia underwrote all of the costs of studying and planning for 
what would become a sovereign-sponsored campaign of Columbia’s ex-
pansion.  This expansion was not selected from a list of competing plans 
for Manhattanville’s redevelopment.  Indeed, the record demonstrates that 
EDC committed to rezoning Manhattanville, not for the goal of general 
economic development or to remediate an area that was “blighted” before 
Columbia acquired over 50% of the property, but rather solely for the ex-
pansion of Columbia itself. . . .  The record shows no evidence that ESDC 
placed any constraints upon Columbia’s plans, required any accommoda-
tion of existing or competing uses, or any limitations on the scale or con-
figuration of Columbia’s scheme for the annexation of Manhattanville. 
 Thus, the record makes plain that rather than the identity of the ulti-
mate private beneficiary being unknown at the time that the redevelop-
ment scheme was initially contemplated, the ultimate private beneficiary 
of the scheme for the private annexation of Manhattanville was the proge-
nitor of its own benefit.  The record discloses that every document consti-
tuting the plan was drafted by the preselected private beneficiary’s attor-
neys and consultants and architects, from the General Project Plan, the 
Special District Zoning Text, the City Map Override Proposal, and the 
Land Use Restrictions to all phases of the environmental review.  Even 
the blight study on which ESDC originally proposed to base its findings 
was prepared by Columbia’s consultant AKRF, nominally retained by 
ESDC for the purpose, but which retention and use by ESDC was roundly 
condemned by this Court in Tuck-It-Away I.124 
 
 123. Id. at 14-15. 
 124. Id.  
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Although the private entity was in fact never hidden in the Manhattan-
ville project, the overall private purpose and self-serving findings of blight 
merge and were nearly fused in the view of the court: 
Having committed to allow Columbia to annex Manhattanville, the EDC 
and ESDC were compelled to engineer a public purpose for a quintessen-
tially private development: eradication of blight. . . .  This conduct con-
tinued when ESDC authorized AKRF to use a methodology biased in Co-
lumbia’s favor.  Specifically, AKRF was to “highlight” such blight 
conditions as it found, and it was to prepare individual building reports 
“focusing on characteristics that demonstrate blight conditions.”  This 
search for distinct “blight conditions” led to the preposterous summary of 
building and sidewalk defects compiled by AKRF, which was then ac-
cepted as a valid methodology and amplified by Earth Tech.  Even a cur-
sory examination of the study reveals the idiocy of considering things like 
unpainted block walls or loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted 
neighborhood.  Virtually every neighborhood in the five boroughs will 
yield similar instances of disrepair that can be captured in close-up tech-
nicolor. 
 No rationale was presented by the respondent for the wholly arbitrary 
standard of counting any lot built to 60% or less of maximum FAR as 
constituting a blighted condition.  To the contrary, the New York City 
Department of City Planning uses a 50% standard to identify “underbuilt” 
lots . . . .  The difference between AKRF’s 60% standard and the petition-
ers’ “no blight” study’s 40% standard is the difference between 39% of 
the area and 20% of the area being counted as underutilized.125 
They not only rejected the blight findings in the instant case, but also the 
whole idea that takings can be based on underutilization since that trans-
forms blight removal from being the elimination of harmful social and eco-
nomic conditions to affirmatively requiring the ultimate commercial devel-
opment of all property.126  They concluded that the taking on behalf of 
Columbia was not for the public’s benefit but for the benefit of “a private 
elite education institution” and that this conflicts with Kelo on virtually 
every level, thereby rendering the taking unconstitutional.127 
In New York, however, the Court of Appeals has the final say, and it 
slammed the Appellate Division and pulled the rug out from under its de-
 
 125. Id. at 16-17. 
 126. See id. at 18-20 (citing Gallentin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 
A.2d 447, 460 (N.J. 2007)) (“under that approach, any property that is operated in a less 
than optimal manner is arguably ‘blighted.’  If such an all-encompassing definition of 
‘blight’ were adopted, most property in the State would be eligible for redevelopment”); In 
re Condemnation by Redevelopment Auth. of Lawrence Cnty., 962 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 
2008), appeal denied, 973 A.2d 1008 (Pa. 2009)); Kaur, supra note 105, at 19. 
 127. Kaur, 72 A.D.3d at 20. 
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terminations.  The Court of Appeals held that a court may only substitute 
its own judgment for that of the legislative body authorizing the project 
when such judgment is “irrational or baseless:”128 
Thus given our precedent, the de novo review of the record undertaken by 
the plurality of the Appellate Division was improper.  On the “record 
upon which the ESDC determination was based and by which we are 
bound,”129 it cannot be said that ESDC’s finding of blight was irrational 
or baseless.  Indeed, ESDC considered a wide range of factors including 
the physical, economic, engineering and environmental conditions at the 
Project site . . . .  Accordingly, since there is record support—“extensively 
documented photographically and otherwise on a lot-by-lot basis”130 …—
for ESDC’s determination that the Project site was blighted, the Appellate 
Division erred when it substituted its view for that of the legislatively des-
ignated agency.131 
This “irrational or baseless” standard would appear to be even more diffi-
cult to establish than the “arbitrary and capricious” standard otherwise used 
for review of governmental and agency decisions in New York State 
which, itself, is very difficult to show.132  This means that effectively there 
is no review of blight findings in New York. 
IV.  ATTEMPTED REFORMS 
In the majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Stevens 
sent a clear message to states that the opportunity to reform the statutory 
and procedural aspects of eminent domain belonged to them.  “We emphas-
ize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further re-
strictions on its exercise of the takings power.”133  State legislatures wasted 
little time in responding to the immediate and passionate backlash follow-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision upholding the economically de-
pressed City of New London’s exercise of its eminent domain powers in 
the furtherance of economic development.  Although blight had not been an 
issue in Kelo because the City did not predicate its taking of Susette Kelo’s 
property and that of her neighbors on that basis, the intensity and broad-
 
 128. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 235, 254 (2010). 
 129. Id. at 254 (citing In re Levine v N.Y. State Liq. Auth., 23 N.Y.2d 863, 864 (1969)). 
 130. Id. at 255. 
 131. Id. 
 132. This latter review standard is known as an Article 78 review.  N.Y. C.P.R.L. 78.  
 133. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
GOLD&SAGALYN_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:02 PM 
2011] THE USE AND ABUSE OF BLIGHT 1151 
based, nonpartisan character of the backlash sent a direct signal to state leg-
islators that this was the time to take action on the issue.134 
The Institute for Justice (IJ), a nonprofit, libertarian public interest law 
firm dedicated to advocacy of property rights and, in the case of eminent 
domain, prohibition of its use for private development, represented Kelo 
throughout the nearly four and a half years of litigation and promoted mod-
el legislation through its “nationwide grassroots activism project,” The 
Castle Coalition, which organizes efforts to obtain eminent domain re-
forms.135  Its main objective has been to promote the elimination of statuto-
ry authority for the use of eminent domain powers for economic develop-
ment through state constitutional amendments.  However, as an alternative 
to a partial repeal of statutory authority, the IJ has advocated for tightening 
statutory definitions of blight as well as specific procedural reforms that it 
believes would “discourage the abuse of eminent domain . . . (1) allowing a 
former owner to regain ownership of condemned property if the govern-
ment fails to use it within a given period of time; (2) time limits on blight 
or redevelopment designations; [and] (3) attorneys fees for condemnees 
challenging the validity of takings.”136 
In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, forty-three states 
enacted post-Kelo reforms, and all but one (Rhode Island, which did not act 
until 2008) did so relatively quickly, within two years of Kelo.  Immediate-
ly following the June 23, 2005 decision, legislators in five states (Alabama, 
Delaware, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas) took action; in 2006, another twen-
ty-seven followed suit; and in 2007, ten more.137  Only seven states, in ad-
dition to the District of Columbia, have not enacted any reforms—
Arkansas,138 Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi,139 New Jersey, New 
 
 134. See generally Lynne B. Sagalyn, Positioning Politics: Kelo, Eminent Domain and 
the Press, in LAND AND POWER: THE IMPACT OF EMINENT DOMAIN ON URBAN COMMUNITIES, 
49, 49-74 (Timothy N. Castano ed., 2008). 
 135. THE CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 136. Model Language for State Statutes Limiting Eminent Domain Abuse, THE CASTLE 
COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org/survivalguide/310?task=view (last visited Apr. 
18, 2011). 
 137. See Table 2, infra. 
 138. In the case of Arkansas, a court decision had already ruled that eminent domain 
could not be used when the primary purpose of the taking is tax enhancement via economic 
development. Elaine B. Sharp & Donald Haider-Markel, At the Invitation of the Court: 
Eminent Domain Reform in State Legislatures in the Wake of the Kelo Decision, 38 PUB-
LIUS: J. FEDERALISM 556, 563 (2008).  
 139. In the case of both Mississippi and Oklahoma, pre-Kelo state constitutional language 
restricted private-to-private takings. Id. at 571 n.3.  Constitutional amendments in both Mis-
sissippi and Oklahoma also have made the determination of the character of the use a matter 
of judicial review, without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.  EMINENT 
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York, and Oklahoma.140  These post-Kelo “reforms” vary widely, and the 
extent to which they constitute symbol or substance is an empirical ques-
tion.141  The Castle Coalition graded each state on a scale from “A” to “F” 
following an analysis of each state’s legislation, placing heavy emphasis on 
whether the legislation placed effective restrictions on blight and the uses 
of eminent domain for economic development and on whether the reform 
was effectuated through a constitutional amendment.142 
As a condition for condemnation, twenty-three of the forty-three post-
Kelo legislative “reforms” made explicit exceptions to their prohibitions if 
the exercise of eminent domain is intended to address or eradicate 
“blight.”143  These exceptions were not without qualification, however.  
Commonly, qualification took the form of a detailed, specific definition of 
the term that sometimes narrowed the criteria and sometimes did very little 
to make it more restrictive.  As Lynn E. Blais has noted, “these states have 
uniformly adopted language limiting the exception [for blight] in an at-
tempt to preclude the exception from swallowing the rule,”144 i.e., the re-
mainder of the law’s requirements. 
What were the most significant reforms to the states’ open-ended blight 
criteria?  Which states significantly redefined blight criteria in ways that 
presumptively narrowed its applications, and which notably did nothing to 
reform blight criteria, nor made other reforms that would have made the 
use of condemnation more restrictive?  And what can explain the differenc-
es in state actions? 
Taken as a whole, the post-Kelo legislation reflects a spectrum of ap-
proaches to reforming “blight” as a precondition to takings.  One approach 
was to eliminate blight as a condition for condemnation takings, pure and 
 
DOMAIN LAW FIRMS, http://eminentdomainlawfirms.com/national-content.cfm/Article/ 
34196/Constitutional-Or-Statutory-Definitions.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
 140. See supra note 136. 
 141. See generally Sharp & Haider-Markel, supra note 138; Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol 
or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo (Ill. Law & Econ. Re-
search Papers Series, Research Paper No. LE07-037, 2008). 
 142. Morriss, supra note 141, at 14. 
 143. The blight exemption numbers tallied by Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the 
Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 674 n.112 (2007), are as of November 2006.  
Between December 2006 and January 2011, ten additional states passed eminent domain 
legislation and Utah rolled back its pre-Kelo eminent domain legislation in 2007. See infra 
Table 2.  To bring the data on blight exemptions current, to January 2011, we consulted the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, which gives bill summaries of eminent domain 
legislation passed by year and then reviewed the bill specifics. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LE-
GIS., http://www.ncsl.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). See supra note 135 and infra Table 2; 
see also Edward J. López et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to 
the Kelo Backlash, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 101 app. (2009). 
 144. Blais, supra note 143, at 674. 
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simple.  Removing a finding of blight as pre-condition may address the 
problems relating to its application and the negative psychological effects 
of being labeled as blighted, but it does not reduce the use of eminent do-
main; rather, it removes one of the required conditions to its use thereby 
making use easier.  Perhaps that is why only two states went in that direc-
tion: Florida, which banned all blight condemnations, even those that occur 
in areas that would meet a “strict” definition of that term;145 and New Mex-
ico, which removed the power of eminent domain from the State’s Metro-
politan Redevelopment Code and no longer allows condemnations based on 
blight, except for a condition known as “antiquated platting.”146  Utah, 
which Somin and Blais cite as the one pre-Kelo exception that had removed 
the power of eminent domain from redevelopment agencies, rolled back 
that law in 2007,147 with an exception for blight, which brings the total to 
twenty-four of forty-four (fifty-five percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145. See H.B. 1567, 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (signed into law May 11, 2006); Ilya 
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2100, 2138 (2009). 
 146. A “plat” is a plan or map of a specific land area.  “Antiquated platting” is a prema-
ture subdivision that “occurs when a property owner divides his land into lots for sale with 
no intent to actually develop or construct something on the lots.”  ANNEXATIONS, ANTI-
QUATED PLANNING & ADDRESSING ELEMENT, http://ci.rio-rancho.nm.us/documents/ 
Development%20Services/Vision%202020%20ICP/Vision%202020%20ICP%20(Nov.%20 
2010)/3-A (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).  New Mexico is an interesting case, politically.  In re-
sponse to the Kelo decision, then Governor Richardson established a Task Force to study 
whether legal protections were needed in New Mexico to limit or prohibit the use of emi-
nent domain for economic development purposes.  The Task Force was comprised of twen-
ty-two members, public and private sector experts in the area of eminent domain and com-
mercial and economic development, as well as representatives from small and rural 
communities and state and local government.  By a split vote, ten to seven, the Task Force 
concluded that eminent domain powers should not be used to promote economic develop-
ment, a recommendation that subsequently was enacted by state legislators. H.B. 393, 48th 
Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2007).  Yet in a minority recommendation, seven members of 
the Task Force who would have retained this authority explained that they were concerned 
that the recommendation to remove eminent domain authority from the Metropolitan Rede-
velopment Act would “unduly restrict the ability of local governments to remedy conditions 
that limit economic development and growth.” GOV. RICHARDSON’S TASK FORCE ON THE 
RESPONSIBLE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, FINAL REPORT 
23 (Nov. 14, 2006).  They favored procedural protections that tightened the definition of 
blight and slum areas, increased notice and hearing requirements, and required relocation 
and transition assistance, in addition to other adjustments in the redevelopment law. 
 147. H.B. 365, 2007 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007). 
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Table 2. Treatment of “Blight” in Post-Kelo Reform Legislation. 
State 
Date Reform 
Enacted 
Reform With 
Blight 
Exemption 
Definitional 
Blight 
Reform 
Blight 
Procedural 
Reform 
Alabama 2005 Yes Narrowed  
Alaska 2006 Permitted   
Arizona 2006 (CI) Yes Tightened / 
Slum 
Condition 
PBP / CCE 
Arkansas No Reform    
California 2006 Permitted Somewhat 
Narrowed 
Checklist 
Colorado 2006 Yes  CCE 
Connecticut 2007 Permitted   
Delaware 2005/2009 Permitted Narrowed  
Florida 2006 (CA) No   
Georgia 2006 Yes Tightened / 
Objective 
Factors 
PBP / Checklist 
Hawaii No Reform    
Idaho 2006 Permitted   
Illinois 2006 Yes   
Indiana 2006 Yes Narrowed  
Iowa 2006 Yes  PBP (75%) / 
CCE 
Kansas 2006 Yes Narrowed PBP 
Kentucky 2006 Yes   
Louisiana 2006 Yes Narrowed PBP 
Maine 2006 Yes   
Maryland 2007 Permitted   
Massachusetts No Reform    
Michigan 2005/2006 
(CA) 
Yes  PBP / CCE 
Minnesota 2006 Yes+ Narrowed  
Mississippi None    
Missouri 2006 Yes  PBP (prepon-
derance) 
Montana 2007 Permitted Optics  
Nebraska 2006 Permitted   
Nevada 2007 (CI) Permitted  PBP (66.7%) 
New Hamp-
shire  
2006 Permitted Narrowed  
New Jersey No Reform    
New Mexico 2007 No   
New York No Reform    
North Caroli-
na 
2006 Yes  PBP 
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North Dakota 2007 (CI, 
CA) 
No   
Ohio 2005/2007 Yes Somewhat 
Tightened 
PBP (70%) 
Oklahoma No Reform    
Oregon 2006 (CI) Yes Narrowed PBP 
Pennsylvania 2006 Yes++ Narrowed  
Rhode Island 2008 Permitted   
South Caroli-
na 
2006 Yes Narrowed PBP 
South Dakota 2006 No   
Tennessee 2005 Permitted   
Texas 2005 Yes Broadened  
Utah 2007 (Roll-
back) 
Yes   
Vermont 2006 Yes   
Virginia 2007 Permitted Narrowed PBP 
Washington 2007 Permitted   
West Virginia 2006 Yes  PBP 
Wisconsin 2006 Yes Greater Pro-
tection 
PBP 
Wyoming 2007 No Narrowed PBP 
+ Exempts 2,000 TIF districts. 
++ Exempts First-Class Cities (Philadelphia), Second-Class Cities (Pittsburgh, 
Scranton). 
Sources: THE CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT 
DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (2007), available at http://www.castle 
coalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf; Blais, supra note 
143, at 671-73; López et al., supra note 143; Somin, supra note 64; NAT’L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGIS., supra note 143 (selected state statutes). 
 
A second, more common approach, was to legislate a redefinition of 
blight that tightened or narrowed the pre-Kelo blight standards to those 
generally conforming to a police-powers rationale, that is, a condition that 
poses a threat, is detrimental to or an actual danger to public health and 
safety, or is unfit for human habitation.  Fifteen states followed this path 
(Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and Wyoming), though Minnesota148 and Pennsylvania149 
 
 148. In the case of Minnesota, the new restrictions exempt the State’s more than 2000 
TIF districts, many of which are in the Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, for up to 
five years. S.F. 2750, § 22, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess (Minn. 2006).  
 149. In the case of Pennsylvania, the new restrictions exempt areas in “a city of the First 
or Second Class,” which under Pennsylvania law includes Philadelphia (the only “First 
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made geographic exceptions that, in effect, significantly restrict the scope 
of the redefinition’s impact.  Five other states (i.e., California,150 Mon-
tana,151 Ohio,152 Tennessee,153 and Wisconsin154) only somewhat narrowed 
the criteria for a positive finding of blight.  In addition, some states (Cali-
fornia155 and Georgia156) took a checklist approach, requiring the presence 
of several criteria for a positive finding of blight, though this did not 
change the reality that only a few states (seven of the fifty) have legislated 
such a requirement. 
This is not what might be called strict “blight” reform, that is, substan-
tively rewritten blight definitions that limit all condemnations to where 
there is documented evidence that the property meets objective blight or 
slum standards: that it is unfit for human habitation, creates a threat to 
health, safety, infant mortality, or creates a threat of crime or disease and 
that condemnation is necessary to wipe out the blight.157  Redefining the 
criteria for a finding would represent substantive reform, however modest 
in some cases, but without in-place measurable, objective standards (as in 
Georgia158), “blight” determinations remain elusively subjective and, open 
to abuse in the absence of other procedural safeguards or statutory or judi-
cial standards of heightened scrutiny.  Some states (Arizona,159 Colora-
do,160 Iowa,161 and Michigan162) now require “clear and convincing evi-
dence” of blight, though this does not appear to eliminate the subjective 
nature of the assessment. 
 
Class” city), Pittsburgh (the only “Second Class” city), and Scranton (the only “Second 
Class-A” city), among others that were certified as blighted under the urban redevelopment 
law on or before its effective date, until the end of 2012. H.B. 2054, ch.2, § 203, B.4, B.5, 
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). 
 150. S.B. 1206, § 3, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006).  California enacted a package of five post-
Kelo eminent domain reform bills. S.B. 53, 1206, 1210, 1650, 1809, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2006). 
 151. S.B. 41, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2007); S.B. 363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 
2007). 
 152. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2005). 
 153. S.B. 3296, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006). 
 154. A.B. 657, 2005-2006 Leg. (Wis. 2006). 
 155. See supra note 150. 
 156. H.B. 1313, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006). 
 157. See Eric R. Clayes, That 70s Show: Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform and the 
Administrative Law Revolution, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867 (2006). 
 158. See supra note 156. 
 159. Proposition 207 (Ariz. 2006). 
 160. H.B. 1411, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006). 
 161. H.F. 2351, 81st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006). 
 162. H.B. 5060, S.B. 693, 93d Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006).  
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A third approach, followed somewhat less frequently, was to narrow the 
basis for blight findings to parcel-by-parcel determination as opposed to 
area-wide determination, thereby reducing the possibility that areas without 
a preponderance of blighted structures would be subject to blight takings.  
Sixteen states (Arizona,163 Georgia,164 Iowa,165 Kansas,166 Louisiana,167 
Michigan,168 Missouri,169 Nevada,170 North Carolina,171 Ohio,172 Oregon,173 
South Carolina,174 Virginia,175 West Virginia,176 Wisconsin,177 and Wyom-
ing178) enacted this type of reform, and ten coupled parcel-by-parcel deter-
mination with a redefinition of blight.  The varied response to reining in the 
elusiveness of “blight” standards through a tighter set of qualifying criteria 
when coupled with a parcel-by-parcel determination raises an internal con-
flict of sorts.  As George Lefcoe notes, “a blight definition protective of 
property owners must shield unblighted properties from the threat of con-
demnation, while a blight norm meant to limit economic development to 
areas that desperately need rejuvenation must be predicated on an area-
wide basis and include unblighted properties necessary for a successful 
economic development effort.”179 
Several post-Kelo statutes maintained the status quo on “blight” by re-
taining pre-existing definitions of blight (Illinois,180 Kentucky,181 and 
Maine182) or leaving in place blight definitions that include areas where ob-
stacles to “sound growth” or conditions that constitute an “economic or so-
cial liability” exist (Alaska,183 Colorado,184 Missouri,185 Nebraska,186 North 
 
 163. See supra note 159. 
 164. See supra note 156. 
 165. See supra note 161. 
 166. S.B. 323, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006). 
 167. S.B. 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006). 
 168. See supra note 162. 
 169. H.B. 1944, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006). 
 170. A.B. 102, 74th Leg., 2007 Sess. (Nev. 2007). 
 171. H.B. 1965, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006). 
 172. See supra note 152. 
 173. Meas. 39, 2006 Gen. Election (Or. 2006). 
 174. S.B. 1031, 116th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2006). 
 175. H.B. 2954, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007). 
 176. H.B. 4048, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006).  
 177. See supra note 154. 
 178. H.B. 124, 59th Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2007). 
 179. Lefcoe, After Kelo, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
 180. S.B. 3086, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006). 
 181. H.B. 508, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006). 
 182. L.D. 1870, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2006). 
 183. H.B. 318, 24th Leg., Reg Sess. (Alaska 2006). 
 184. See supra note 160. 
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Carolina,187 Ohio,188 Texas,189 Vermont,190 and West Virginia191).192  Other 
post-Kelo legislative actions did not explicitly address blight criteria 
(Maryland, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Washington). 
These legislated blight “reforms” do not equally represent changes in 
policy.  Consider, for example, the use of economic criteria (#10 from 
Luce’s categorization193), widely considered to be the basis on which con-
demnation for slum clearance moved from a physical and social set of con-
ditions to the “blight that’s right.”194  States that eliminated pre-Kelo “eco-
nomic use” criteria by explicitly enacting blight conditions confined to 
public health and safety criteria were far fewer in number, six (Dela-
ware,195 Indiana,196 Kansas,197 Nevada,198 Oregon,199 and Virginia200), than 
the twenty states that in one way or another narrowed blight criteria.  
Another example relates to the taking of nonblighted properties.  State leg-
islation also only modestly cut back on the use of area or neighborhood cri-
teria in the determination of blight: only five of the thirteen states that in 
pre-Kelo statutes permitted blight criteria categorized as “character of the 
neighborhood” made changes post-Kelo that required redefined blight to 
conform to police-power criteria and/or enacted a requirement for parcel-
by-parcel determination (Arizona,201 Indiana,202 Michigan,203 Nevada,204 
and South Carolina205).  Eight other states using the same “character of 
neighborhood” criteria made no such adjustments. 
 
 185. See supra note 169. 
 186. L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2006). 
 187. See supra note 171. 
 188. See supra note 152. 
 189. S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005). 
 190. S.B. 246, 2005-2006 Leg. (Vt. 2006). 
 191. See supra note 176. 
 192. See Somin, supra note 145, at 2122-25. 
 193. Luce, supra note 15. 
 194. HOYT, supra note 6. 
 195. S.B. 7, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009). 
 196. H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006). 
 197. See supra note 166. 
 198. See supra note 170. 
 199. See supra note 173. 
 200. See supra note 175. 
 201. See supra note 159. 
 202. See supra note 196. 
 203. See supra note 162. 
 204. See supra note 170. 
 205. See supra note 174. 
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As a condition justifying condemnation, the changes relating to blight 
fell way short of the reform movement’s ambitions206 because the legisla-
tive efforts to reform the subjective criteria determinative of positive find-
ings did little to alter the expansive permissiveness under which private 
property in most states can still be condemned as “blighted.”  It is, re-
marked Somin, the common factor “undermining the potential effective-
ness of post-Kelo reform laws.”207  Yet as Lefcoe reminds us in another ex-
pansion of his analysis of redevelopment, 
definitions of blight traditionally have served four related, yet distinct 
functions: (1) a planning justification for planning intervention in city 
building; (2) to delineate the precise boundaries of the areas requiring re-
development; (3) to convince conservative judges in the 1930s and 1940s 
that local implementation of federal program[s] like public housing and 
urban renewal were simply extensions of the common law of nuisance ab-
atement; and (4) to justify the taking of private property by eminent do-
main for re-sale to private developers.208 
That “blight” has proven to be an enduring policy foundation for con-
demnation, whether undertaken under the name of slum clearance, econom-
ic development, or urban revitalization, speaks volumes about the political 
realities of its appeal as a highly malleable concept.  A large and strong 
coalition of mutual interests supports redevelopment.  Though they have 
not been as openly vocal in the policy battles over eminent domain as pro-
ponents of property rights, city officials, redevelopment agencies, urban 
planners, real estate consultants and attorneys, developers, and environ-
mental interest groups have proven to be quite successful at limiting state 
legislative reform of eminent domain statutes that would curb the ability of 
government officials to push forward growth-oriented projects, as noted 
above in the case of Pennsylvania.209  Working through back channels and 
legislative amendments and revisions to weaken the proposed reforms af-
fords greater political protection than overt opposition to such high-profile 
legislation.  Of course, depending upon perspective, these political pres-
sures either undermined reform or left cities, especially those older urban 
centers, with the potential to use condemnation powers for projects of pub-
lic purpose.  Wherever one falls on the spectrum of opinion regarding emi-
nent domain takings, the political durability of blight’s broad-based policy 
justification presents a lesson in the limits of legislative reform. 
 
 206. See Somin, supra note 145, at 7-17. 
 207. Id. at 17. 
 208. Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo, supra note 15, at 818. 
 209. Property Rights Protection Act, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 204 (West 2008). 
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V.  CONFLICTING POLITICAL FORCES 
The backlash to Kelo caught the attention of state legislators, yet state 
legislatures responded in diverse ways, as evident in the blight-definition 
reform discussion above.  Whereas data on the backlash showed that the 
public did not support eminent domain powers as a vital tool for economic 
development, the same cannot be said for state and local government offi-
cials.210  How we understand the post-Kelo politics of eminent domain 
reform is critical to understanding how to interpret legislative results that 
have been an intense topic among academic scholars since the 2005 U.S. 
Supreme Court Kelo decision. Whereas the legal commentary has been 
heavy and steady, analyses of the political dimension have been almost as 
sparse as systematic, empirical evidence on eminent domain abuse.  Two 
empirical studies and the reports of state task forces211 set up to study the 
issue shed insight into the role of political factors in shaping reform out-
comes. 
In an empirical analysis designed to explain the variation in state reform 
efforts, Andrew P. Morriss212 argues that the reason for the variation in 
reform responses across the nation is rationally tied to differences in the 
costs of reform to state legislators in enacting anti-Kelo restrictions on emi-
nent domain powers.  Since such restrictions would curb a politically useful 
means of distributing resources to supporters, the following expectations 
would hold: (1) strong interest groups would impose greater costs to legis-
lators; (2) strong opponents of reform also would increase costs to legisla-
tors; (3) an expanding economic pie would generate more opportunities for 
rewards and for change, and decrease costs to legislators; and (4) when the 
legislature is restricted in raising taxes or the economy is not growing, the 
constraints imposed on legislators would be greater.  Morriss’ findings are 
 
 210. State officials are as much a part of this constituency as local officials because when 
the latter do not have the powers and economic aids they turn to their colleagues in state 
government for help. 
 211. Seven states set up either a task force or study commission on eminent domain: 
Connecticut (ROBERT S. POLINER, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROP. RIGHTS, GOODWILL 
STUDY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY COMM. PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT COMM. (2008)); Indi-
ana (IND. LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERIM STUDY COMM. ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN (2005)); Missouri (STATE OF MISSOURI, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE MISSOURI EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE (2005)); Ohio (LEGIS. TASK FORCE OF THE 
STATE OF OHIO, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY EMINENT DOMAIN (2006)); 
New Mexico (GOV. RICHARDSON’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 146); Oklahoma (the 
Joint Task Force on Eminent Domain never submitted a report due to the 2006 Oklahoma 
Supreme Court decision in Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County. v. Edward 
L. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (2006)), and Washington (ATT’Y GEN. OF WASH., EMINENT DO-
MAIN TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2009)). 
 212. See generally Morriss, supra note 141. 
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suggestive of the political story behind the observed legislative results of 
eminent domain reform.  Based upon a multivariate analysis of forty-eight 
state responses,213 Morriss found that: (1) spending and revenue restrictions 
make substantive reforms less likely; (2) legislatures in growing states were 
more likely to adopt reforms than legislatures in stagnant or declining 
states; (3) the impact of politics is important in one dimension: as Republi-
can legislative strength increases, adoption of substantive reform becomes 
more likely; and (4) measures of ideological climate were not important to 
explaining the variation in state responses.214 
A study by Elaine B. Sharp and Donald Haider-Merkel, which also 
sought to explain the considerable variation by which legislators restricted 
the power of eminent domain following Kelo, similarly found a lack of 
compelling evidence that citizens’ backlash and demand for change shaped 
post-Kelo legislative actions.215  Rather, their results emphasize the impor-
tance of organized interests at the state level and the role of populist or 
grassroots activism in the politics of eminent domain reform.  “Eminent 
domain reform” they conclude: 
[A]ppears to have some of the features of a populist uprising—one that is 
reactive to a history of presumably controversial eminent domain takings 
and one that has had greater legislative success in states where the ab-
sence of the expertise and resources associated with professionalized de-
velopment of issue solutions leaves an opening for grass roots activism to 
be more influential.216 
Insight into the political process of reform can be found in a portrait of 
the deliberations of the Missouri General Assembly in its attempted reform 
of the state’s eminent domain statute, as documented by Professor Dale A. 
Whitman in a legislative memoir.217  Just five days after the Kelo decision, 
then-Governor Matt Blunt announced the formation of a task force to ex-
amine “the use of eminent domain, especially when the proposed public 
use of the property being acquired is not directly owned or primarily used 
 
 213. In some instances, states responded more than once. 
 214. Id. at 35-41. 
 215. Sharp & Haider-Markel, supra note 138. 
 216. Id. at 569. 
 217. Whitman, supra note 36, at 721.  A long-time property law professor, Whitman had 
been asked to serve as a consultant by the Burlington Northern-Santa Fe Railroad to track 
and analyze the legislation on eminent domain that was to be considered in the 2006 legisla-
tive session.  After being assured that when speaking to legislators and their staff that he 
would be expressing his own independent views and not expressing those of the railroad, he 
agreed and spent about twenty-two hours in the State Capital meeting with legislators and 
staff members.  The Missouri House of Representatives had just adopted H.B. 1944, and it 
was ready to be sent to the Senate. 
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by the general public.”218  The Governor’s task force did not take the “radi-
cal” step of recommending that eminent domain no longer be available for 
urban redevelopment efforts.  Nor did it endorse a citizen proposed initia-
tive for a constitutional amendment that would have called for an all-out 
ban on the use of condemnation powers for private-to-private transfers.  
Rather, its actions reflected a conscious determination not to stifle urban 
regeneration and growth that would have been highly detrimental to urban 
redevelopment efforts.219 
A number of bills relating to eminent domain were filed in the 2006 ses-
sion of the Missouri General Assembly, but only one received serious at-
tention: H.B. 1944.220  After quick passage in the House of Representa-
tives, the bill arrived in the Senate, where, Whitman reports, it was greeted 
with much less enthusiasm: 
There seemed to be a fairly widespread view among likely Senate han-
dlers that the bill represented considerable political risk.  Since nearly any 
provision that was attractive to the Farm Bureau and property rights advo-
cates seemed likely to be opposed by the real estate development commu-
nity and the governments of the state’s major cities, a close association 
with the bill evidently seemed to many senators a “no-win game.”221 
Serious and creative leadership, skillful negotiation of compromise, and 
deft drafting of modifications would be needed for the House bill to pass 
the Senate.  Two issues stand out for the purposes of this Article: delibera-
tions over a redefinition of blight and the making of blight determinations 
on a parcel-to-parcel basis.  In both cases, the results to date conform to the 
“political clashes” noted above.  Among legislators as well as the Gover-
nor-appointed Task Force, Whitman noted, there was no enthusiasm to take 
on the job of redefining “blight” despite the fact that the statutory defini-
tions were recognized as definitively vague.222  When it came to reform, 
pragmatism prevailed.  “Redefining blight was widely regarded as a morass 
that could consume huge resources of time and energy with very little 
payoff.  Even the Eminent Domain Task Force concluded that ‘a complete 
overhaul of the blight definition is not obtainable.’”223  On the question of 
whether every parcel in a redevelopment project must be blighted as the 
Senate Committee bill had said, that chamber’s leader on the bill, Senator 
 
 218. Id. at 742. 
 219. Id. at 730. 
 220. Supra note 169. 
 221. Id. at 732. 
 222. Id. at 735-43. 
 223. Id. at 742. 
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Chris Koster, presented a compromise in a substitute bill.  His language 
provided that: 
[T]he condemning authority shall individually consider each parcel of 
property in the defined area with regard to whether the property meets the 
relevant statutory definition of blight.  If the condemning authority finds a 
preponderance of the defined redevelopment area is blighted, it may pro-
ceed with condemnation of any parcels in such area.224 
While the language of the compromise—“preponderance”—was “some-
what ambiguous,” Whitman noted that it was “mutually acceptable and 
would seldom be a barrier to actual redevelopment projects.”225  Other 
states have used a similar approach but with thresholds that are a little 
higher.  The trend since Kelo has been to move the percentage required 
higher.  In assessing the legislative effort on blight reform, Whitman con-
cluded that: 
[T]he blight provisions of the final legislation did very little harm to rede-
velopment, but neither did they do much to clean up abuses.  Landowners 
were placed in a better procedural posture when they sought to challenge 
findings of blight, but they could point to very little in the bill that im-
proved their substantive chances of success.226 
While expressing disappointment in the fact that blight was not redefined 
and that reform did not address the lack of serious judicial review of local 
determinations of blight, Whitman concluded that outside groups viewing 
these results from afar might well discount the extreme difficulty legisla-
tors and legal experts faced in finding a legal solution, as distinct from a 
political solution, to this problem.227  The General Assembly left the de-
termination of what is a legitimate or illegitimate taking to the political 
process, which Whitman concluded may still be the best venue for these 
determinations: 
[W]hen a taking is authorized that offends local sensibilities broadly, the 
political repercussions on the decision-makers are apt to be most imme-
diate and direct. . . .  Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that conservatives, who 
usually argue against centralization of political power and who favor local 
autonomy, have taken the view in the eminent domain controversy of 
2005-06 that property owners need protection from local government by 
an “activist” Supreme Court.228 
 
 224. S.S. H.B. 1944, § 523.274 (cited in Whitman, supra note 36, at 742 (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 225. Whitman, supra note 36, at 742. 
 226. Id. at 743. 
 227. Id. at 765. 
 228. Id. at 765. 
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Lynn E. Blais, a strong supporter of the availability of eminent domain 
for economic development projects, is critical of the post-Kelo modifica-
tions that have been made to eminent domain statutes: 
Overall, the post-Kelo eminent domain statutes overwhelmingly share two 
characteristics: they limit the use of eminent domain to transfer private 
property from one owner to another for economic development purposes 
and they make exceptions to that prohibition for the eradication of blight. 
These two components, taken together, are unlikely to meaningfully limit 
the ability of state and local governments to pursue urban revitalization 
projects.  They are very likely, however, to channel such projects in ways 
that make them less effective, less efficient, and dramatically less fair.229 
She believes that the increased application and use of a blight requirement 
will “require local governments to wait until a city area is in substantial de-
cline (i.e. blighted) before engaging in revitalization projects.”230  This, she 
believes, will make it more difficult and costly to involve private develop-
ers in revitalizations because more projects will be forced into poor and 
minority areas.231  Is she correct?  And is this an incidental effect of these 
changes, or was it one of the purposes of the changes made post-Kelo? 
Berman v. Parker232 was a unanimous decision approving the use of 
condemnation for urban renewal that raised little outcry.  The decision in 
Kelo, more than fifty years later, approved a more limited condemnation 
and imposed more requirements, yet the vote was only five to four in favor 
and a huge outcry followed.  Is this because the Supreme Court, and the na-
tion as a whole, has become more conservative and more protective of 
property rights than it was at the time Berman was decided?  Or is it be-
cause there is stronger and more vocal opposition to condemnations of pri-
vate homes in white suburban communities than there is to takings in poor 
and minority areas of large cities like Washington D.C.?  Remember, there 
was no requirement for blight findings in Kelo.  To this comparison we 
should also add the perception held by opponents of the project in Kelo, 
and then the decision in Kelo, that the New London project had a relatively 
low public versus private benefit ratio. 
Much of the Kelo outcry, according to at least one expert on blight and 
redevelopment, Wendell E. Prichett, may have come from the fact that the 
pattern of eminent domain use has dramatically changed over this time pe-
riod, with a large number of condemnations occurring in suburban areas.  
“Put simply, eminent domain has received more attention over the past year 
 
 229. Blais, supra note 143, at 676. 
 230. Id. at 685. 
 231. Id. at 685-87. 
 232. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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(i.e. 2005) because the people involved in these disputes are middle-class 
suburban homeowners and small businessmen, particularly those in older, 
built-out suburbs.”233  If this is the underlying socio-economic foundation 
of the backlash, then the post-Kelo legislative reforms that narrowed the 
definition of blight probably served this class of voters while also curbing a 
few of the more egregious abuses arising from the term’s breadth.  As the 
history of urban renewal projects in the post-World War II era make clear, 
poor and minority communities suffered disproportionally from the whole-
sale clearance of blighted neighborhoods, and many people, including 
Blais, now oppose the use of condemnation where it has that result.234  
“Making ‘blight’ a precondition for economic development takings,” as 
Columbia Law School Professor Thomas A. Merrill noted in testimony be-
fore the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “seems designed largely 
to reassure the middle class that its property will not be targeted for such 
projects, not to protect the very poorest communities.”235  As we have 
shown, those living in poor and minority areas in large- and medium-sized 
cities received no similar benefit from the post-Kelo legislative modifica-
tions. 
VI.  CREATING BETTER SAFEGUARDS 
The Kelo backlash motivated many legislatures to enact reform laws that 
would provide better protection to property owners, in particular, home 
owners, facing condemnation actions, and toward that end, as we discussed 
earlier, a number of state legislatures have tried to find ways to alter re-
quirements relating to findings of blight.  Some states have amended their 
laws to restrict or prohibit condemnation of individual parcels that are 
 
 233. Prichett based his conclusion on a review of articles on eminent domain disputes 
following Kelo during the four-month period of June 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005.  Of the 
fifty separate disputes uncovered from searches on Lexis, Westlaw, and American newspa-
pers, twenty-four were located in suburban areas. Prichett, supra note 90, at 909 n.62.  On 
the character of the backlash see, Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Prop-
erty: Kelo and the Perfect Storm (Nw. U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, 
Paper No. 07-05, 2008).  Nadler, Diamond, and Patton analyzed reactions of citizens as re-
vealed in several polls taken after the decision and found that the type of property being tak-
en—a business, a home, or vacant land—shapes the level of support for the use of eminent 
domain powers, as does the proposed use for the property, whether it is to be taken for a 
school, a shopping center, or high-value homes.  While poll data indicated a “vigorous and 
apparently uniform response to Kelo,” the authors conclude that this “should not be con-
fused with what is actually a more nuanced public evaluation” and not a wholesale rejection 
of the legitimacy of eminent domain. Id. at 23. 
 234. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 27-37. 
 235. The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14-16 (2005) (statement of 
Thomas W. Merrill). 
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themselves not blighted.  North Carolina previously allowed redevelopment 
agencies to take unblighted properties if two-thirds of the buildings within 
the area were blighted.  But now each individual parcel to be taken must be 
evaluated and determined to be blighted.236 
Georgia’s redevelopment law now requires that all property to be taken 
must be blighted.237  In addition, the public agency undertaking a condem-
nation is now required to give “notice in writing to the property owner re-
garding specific harm caused by the property and [the] owner has failed to 
take reasonable measures to remedy the harm.”238 
Minnesota has altered its law to require that each building to be taken be 
determined to be structurally substandard “unless there is no feasible alter-
native to the taking of the parcels on which the buildings are located in or-
der to remediate the blight and all possible steps are taken to minimize the 
taking of buildings that are not structurally substandard.”239  It is not yet 
clear how the “no feasible alternative” language will be interpreted.  If it 
means only the equivalent of no reasonable alternative, it may not turn out 
to mean much. 
A prohibition against taking unblighted parcels could serve to limit one 
unfortunate tendency: the tendency to expand the size of redevelopment 
districts.  The larger the area, the easier it will be to find more examples of 
blight.  If the number of citations of examples of blight is all that counts in 
finding an area blighted, rather than the degree of blight, unblighted parcels 
can easily be included, and the larger the area, the better.240  The desire to 
include developable areas, together with ones capable of showing blight, 
not only leads toward larger areas, but also leads to strangely shaped dis-
tricts, shapes which Colin Gordon refers to appropriately as “gerryman-
dered.”  In drawing the boundaries, the areas that are most intensely 
blighted may be avoided in order to better assure an ability to develop the 
chosen zone.  In TIFs, large, developable areas will capture more of the 
property growth potential and increased taxes.  For government officials 
and municipal bond underwriters, the larger area means a safer bet that the 
TIF district will be able to pay off the bonds.  Hence the expression: “the 
blight that’s right.”241  A striking confirmation of this is the nearly one 
hundred percent growth in the size of TIF districts in California, to over 
 
 236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-515 (2007).  See generally Carolyn A. Pearce, Forcing Ur-
ban Redevelopment To Proceed “Building by Building”: North Carolina’s Flawed Policy 
Response to Kelo v. City of New London, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1784, 1790 (2007). 
 237. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (2006). 
 238. Id. § 22-1-1(1)(A)(iii). 
 239. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.075 (West 2008).   
 240. Gordon, supra note 3, at 320-27. 
 241. Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that’s Right, supra note 15, at 995. 
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eight hundred acres, following the approval of Proposition 13 and its tight 
limits on property taxes which we discussed earlier.242  When TIF district 
lines are deliberately drawn to include unblighted parcels ripe for develop-
ment that are likely to be the first to be redeveloped and, thus, the most 
immediate source of increments for repaying the bonds, officials can be 
said to be engaging in what we would call “TIF gerrymandering.”243 
It must be remembered, however, that blocking the taking of individual, 
unblighted parcels in a large project area (which is otherwise generally 
blighted and a good candidate for an appropriate economic development 
project) can render the project too costly or otherwise impossible to imple-
ment.  While based on a simple, understandable principle (“if it ain’t 
blighted, don’t take it”), such an approach to the problem is probably too 
simplistic, and potentially counterproductive—effectively throwing the ba-
by out with the bath water.  North Carolina, prior to Kelo, allowed takings 
of parcels that were “necessary or incidental” to a project in which at least 
two-thirds of the buildings were of a blighted character.244  In 2006 they 
amended the law to move away from the concept of a “blighted area” to 
that of a “blighted parcel.”245  But this change according to commentators, 
will curtail the ability of planners to efficiently address redevelopment, 
forcing programs to move on a “lot by lot, building by building” basis.246  
Blais makes a similar point.247  We agree.  In the Times Square Project cer-
tain properties were omitted from the taking intentionally (notably, a hotel 
and an office building), but having to omit all small sites that were not 
blighted would have prevented the acquisition of the critical mass required 
for the Project as a whole.  This was true in the Atlantic Yards Project as 
well. 
Another approach being taken is to shift the burden of proof on un-
blighted parcels to the government.  An example of this can be is found in 
West Virginia where the legislature has authorized property owners who 
wish to challenge a taking to go directly to the circuit court to get a review 
determining if any unblighted property to be taken is “necessary” for the 
 
 242. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 327. 
 243. Lefcoe provides one such example where a redevelopment agency stretched the 
boundaries of an existing project area to encompass a purely private development of about 
twenty-five acres about to be built. See Lefcoe, After Kelo, supra note 15, at 64-65 (discuss-
ing Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199-200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)).  
Their plan was to make use of two projects in their TIF that were already underway to gen-
erate about $126,000 in annual tax revenues. See id. at 65. 
 244. See Pearce, supra note 236, at 1789-90.   
 245. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-515 (2006). 
 246. Pearce, supra note 236, at 1790-91 (discussing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 
(1954)). 
 247. See Blais, supra note 143, at 684-85. 
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project, and to require the agency to show that with respect to the project 
each of the following is true: 
(1) That the project cannot proceed without the condemnation of the pri-
vate property at issue; 
(2) That the private property shown not to be blighted cannot be inte-
grated into the proposed project or program once the slum and blighted 
area surrounding such property is taken and cleared; 
(3) That the condemnation of the unblighted property is necessary for 
the clearance of an area deemed to be slum or blighted; 
(4) That other alternatives to the condemnation of the unblighted proper-
ty are not reasonably practical; 
(5) That every reasonable effort has been taken to ensure that the un-
blighted property and its owners have been given a reasonable opportunity 
to be included in the redevelopment project or plan without the use of emi-
nent domain; 
(6) That no alternative site within the slum and blighted area is available 
for purchase by negotiation that might substitute as a site for the unblighted 
property; 
(7) That the redevelopment project or plan could not be restructured to 
avoid the taking of the unblighted property; 
(8) That the redevelopment project or plan could not be carried out with-
out the use of eminent domain; and 
(9) That there is specific use for the unblighted property to be taken and 
a plan to redevelop and convert the unblighted property from its current use 
to the stated specific use basically exists.248 
To allow unblighted parcels to be taken in order to facilitate a larger 
project, but still add better protection against excessively easy or abusive 
findings of blight, Pennsylvania has created a comparatively more detailed 
definition of blight that focuses on the characteristics of individual proper-
ties.249 
In some states, the courts have elevated powers to review agency deter-
minations as a safeguard, or a way of limiting certain condemnations.  Five 
states are generally recognized for their heightened judicial scrutiny in 
eminent domain cases.250  The five states are Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, 
Michigan, and Texas.251  Their expanded level of review appears to have 
come from the courts themselves rather than from acts of the state legisla-
 
 248. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-6A (West 2006).  See also Blais, supra note 143, at 676. 
 249. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205 (West 2008).  See also Lefcoe, After Kelo, supra 
note 15, at 58. 
 250. See Sharp & Haider-Markel, supra note 138, at 563. 
 251. See id. at 571 n.1. 
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ture.  Ohio is another one.  In 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court held in City of 
Norwood v. Horney252 that Ohio courts must apply heightened scrutiny 
when reviewing statutes that regulate the use of eminent domain powers.253  
The Ohio Supreme Court decided that “rote deference” to municipalities 
was not a proper judicial standard and that it did not comport with appro-
priate separation of powers.254  It concluded its opinion in City of Norwood 
by finding that the Norwood Code’s definition of “deteriorating area” was a 
“standardless standard” that merely “recites a host of subjective factors that 
invite ad hoc and selective enforcement” and it held that the use of “deteri-
orating area” as a standard for determining whether private property is sub-
ject to appropriation was “void for vagueness.”255 
Such review by courts may provide a level of scrutiny that limits clear 
abuses, and could raise the requirements for finding blight.  But we ques-
tion whether judges can ever undertake the level of effort, or possess the 
amount of knowledge, that would be needed to produce a balanced set of 
sophisticated criteria and standards required for a good definition of blight.  
But, as we have seen in the New York Appellate Division’s decision in 
Kaur, a heightened level of scrutiny in the review of governmental findings 
of blight can be an eye opener and a potential control over an otherwise un-
regulated ability to make findings, and would in Kaur have produced a dif-
ferent outcome if it had been the final decision. 
A better way to combat these unfortunate dynamics and control expan-
sive, overreaching determinations of blight, without excluding unblighted 
parcels needed for the project, could be achieved by changing the require-
ments away from strings of citations of examples of blight, and replacing it 
with a definition crafted by experts in the field that excludes the most 
abused components and requires finding the degree of blight, and showing 
a minimum level of blight.  This will require statutes with smart standards 
and at least some degree of objective quantification. 
Some standards currently used should be excluded.  One that cries out 
for such elimination (or very strict control) is “underutilization”256 because 
 
 252. 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006). 
 253. See id. at 1143; see also Nicholas M. Gieseler & Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Strict 
Scrutiny and Eminent Domain after Kelo 21-22 (Pacific Legal Foundation, Program of Judi-
cial Awareness, Working Paper, No. 09-005, 2009). 
 254. Horney, 853 N.E.2d at 1137-39.  It also found that the analysis by the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in, County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), and 
those presented by the dissenting judges of the Supreme Court of Connecticut and the dis-
senting justices of the United States Supreme Court in Kelo, were the better models for in-
terpreting its own Constitution. Horney, 853 N.E.2d at 1141. 
 255. Id. at 1145-46. 
 256. See generally Piper, supra note 117 at 1166-72, 1188-91. 
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that standard can pick up every parcel that could be built out further (under 
its current floor area ratio) or rebuilt to a higher and better use.  Also every 
property that has air rights or development rights that have not been sold 
could be condemned using this criteria.  At a minimum, a clear level of 
substantial underutilization, quantifiable on a per-parcel basis, would need 
to be set for this to make sense,257 together with a required percentage of 
parcels that must be found to be “underutilized” at that level.  Such an ap-
proach would more likely mean that deteriorated conditions are truly 
present, not just homes whose zoning has changed over time, or whose 
owners prefer less-than-maximum-size structures. 
Another candidate for total elimination would be the “age” of structures, 
by itself, without regard to conditions.  Age can also correlate with quality 
and architectural distinctiveness and conflicts with the legislated value of 
preserving historic buildings.  Using age as an eligibility criterion for mak-
ing buildings subject to potential clearance goes against the logic of federal 
and local preservation laws and programs that were, in fact, “a response to 
the urban renewal and blight elimination programs of the 1950s and 
1960s.”258  To be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places, a 
building has to be at least fifty years old, or have historical or architectural 
importance that is exceptional.259  Even under state and local historic and 
preservation laws, new buildings are rarely made landmarks.  In New York 
City, “pre-war building” means a pre-World War II residential structure but 
it is also synonymous with space, quality, and higher value. 
The concepts of “future” and “potential” blight should also be eliminat-
ed; they are even more subjective than finding blight on a current basis.  If 
it requires finding that the area is in relative decline, then half the parcels in 
the country could be found to be in decline relative to the other half.  If 
finding that the parcels are in decline in any absolute, measureable way is 
required, then it does not matter how new or valuable the property currently 
is.  Despite the flaws in using future blight as criteria, California appears to 
be one of the few states where the concept has been rejected.260 
As previously mentioned, only seven states currently have any quantifi-
cation requirements in their laws.261  But the quantification in these juris-
dictions is so limited, it does not address the problem: their laws generally 
 
 257. The Appellate Court in Kaur thought a 40 percent or lower Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 
would work as a standard. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 72 A.D.3d 1, 19 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2009). 
 258. Brown, supra note 36, at 226. 
 259. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470-470x-6 (2006). 
 260. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130-
31 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Gordon, supra note 3, at 328. 
 261. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 320 n.134. 
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only require that some percentage of the properties in the designated area 
be found to be blighted for the area to be designated as blighted.  The find-
ings within the qualifying parcels remain based solely on broad subjective 
determinations.  To correctly do what we propose, a panel of experts from 
the fields of sociology, economics, criminology, city planning, engineering, 
and architecture would have to carefully select appropriate, objective stan-
dards and criteria, and then, where possible, determine minimum levels that 
must be found.  Currently, the definitions, if any, are left to politicians, and 
“findings” are left to agencies based on data provided by environmental 
consulting firms, who know they have been hired to try to show the exis-
tence of blight, and to lawyers, who have the same motivation and purpose.  
They have no required standards that have to be met.  They work from the 
findings in prior projects, ones that previously satisfied judicial review 
(which, as we have seen in Kaur, may be effectively non-existent), and put 
together a string of examples and data in a way that makes a case.  There 
are few, if any, factors that they are required to assess, and no factors they 
are required to exclude.262 
Each state wishing to reform its blight criteria would have to have the 
governor, working perhaps with or through an independent academic, pro-
fessional body, or civic organization (to limit business, political, and activ-
ist influence) appoint the panel of experts.  The blight standards proposed 
by the panel would then be subject to public review and comment before 
being sent to the legislature for enactment into law.  The legislature could 
empower the executive branch to develop the definition and provide it with 
the power of law, or the legislature could be required to vote “yes” or “no” 
on the proposed standards without amendments.263  To the extent there is a 
need for or value in having variations in the standards geographically with-
in a state, the experts would be in a good position to provide that.  The re-
sults will of course vary from state to state, as have state laws and reforms 
to date, and the quantification aspects will differ widely, as they should. 
 
 262. Colorado requires a finding of only one of its blight factors for a finding of blight 
that is not contested; a finding of four factors is required if the property taken will be owned 
by the public sector and a finding of five factors of blight is required if the property is trans-
ferred to private entities under urban removal. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-25-103(2)(1) 
(2005), 31-25-105.5(2) (2004).  As a result of this requirement, a local authority must meet 
a greater standard where the appearance of favoritism to a private individual is the highest.  
Brown, supra note 36, at 225. 
 263. Such an approach has been used by Congress and the President for military base 
closings.  Governor Cuomo of New York has proposed the use of executive branch panels to 
shield the legislature from votes on public health care modifications and cuts, to set re-
quirements for state chartered banks, and to effectuate prison closings. Jacob Gershman, 
Cuomo Reaches for Power, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2011, at A15-16. 
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Since this has never been done to our knowledge, it may be best to ask 
that these blight definition panels, try to keep it simple.  However, this is 
not simple stuff.  It is, for example, conceivable, and would in fact be quite 
reasonable, to have the panels provide standards containing alternative mi-
nimums, i.e., lower minimums in one category (e.g. the theft rate) if the 
rate found in second category (e.g., murder or rape rate) is higher.264  Find-
ing that there are mice or rats, even if the frightening phrase “infestations” 
is included, would not be sufficient.  The entire Upper West Side of Man-
hattan has enough mice for it to be found to be blighted on that basis.  
Some greater amount of data would be needed.  Nor would simply finding 
that there are “tax delinquent” properties be sufficient.  There would have 
to be municipal liens for failure to pay taxes, or municipal takings, in 
excess of a specified dollar amount or percentage of the property value, ac-
cumulated over a set period of time.  As the New York Appellate Division 
in Kaur said, if one can count things like unpainted block walls or loose 
awnings “virtually every neighborhood in the five boroughs will yield simi-
lar instances of disrepair . . . .”265  Variations in the quantification would 
also be a way to address regional differences within the state. 
If the state can come up with a good set of standards, then it might also 
consider taking the standards to an even higher level of meaningful applica-
tion; it could provide stricter requirements for uses that have public-to-
private benefit ratios at the low end of the public purpose hierarchy (as of-
fered in this Article or as established by the state).  So for example, “Level 
1 Blight Standards” (the least stringent) would be applicable to the highest 
types of Economic Development Uses, and the most stringent standards 
(say Level 3) would be required for low-end undertakings such as one-to-
one transfers, pure tax enhancement projects, and TIF projects.  A high 
standard should also apply to cases where removal of blight is the sole pub-
lic purpose.  This as we have seen is allowed in New York.266  This could 
also be applied to economic development projects containing small public 
to private benefit ratios.  These should require more demanding standards 
than those having high public to private benefit ratios. 
 
 264. The crime rate as a whole could be a quantitative condition provided it is clearly de-
fined.  In Wisconsin, for a property to be found to be blighted the crime rate on that property 
must be three times, or more, the average crime rate in the city where the property is lo-
cated.  See 2006 Wis. Sess. Laws 233. 
 265. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 72 A.D.3d 1, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 266. Under present law, if found to be blighted, buildings can be taken and cleared to 
land bank or to pave it over. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of blight and eminent domain has been extensively written 
about, sometimes in considerable detail.  Even though the Kelo decision did 
not turn on the issue of blight, it triggered a national debate and substantial 
additional literature, about the use and abuse of eminent domain, and it also 
stimulated state legislatures to enact a series of statutory reforms.  The 
permissive, expansive use of the blight concept has blurred the line be-
tween proper use and abuse, especially when the power of condemnation is 
exercised for economic development purposes.  Over time, this extremely 
loose practice has undermined the use of blight findings as a basis for con-
demnation.  Our exploration here has led us to see the need to impose rea-
son and rigor on an essential subject matter that has evolved without any.  
There has been little to no thoughtful discipline applied as the definition of 
blight has grown and its “finding” expanded.  If blight is to continue to be a 
condition and a cornerstone for condemnations, urban renewals, or eco-
nomic development undertakings, it needs serious alteration.  In the ab-
sence of any real definition or standards, it will continue to serve more as 
an expensive foil for projects sought by developers and government offi-
cials, than as a screen filtering out lands that should be left alone. 
